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59INTRODUCTTON
This  Opi,nion was adopteCl unanimously by the  Eco-
nomic and Soclal. Comnittee of  the  European Communities  at
its  meeting on 30 ApriI  1981. It  1s the  first  devoted ex-
cluslvely  to  the subject of  cornpetition pollcy  and it  appears
at  a  time when a  maJor review of  Community policy  in  thts
field  is  underway, Just  after  a  speclal  Council meeting,
Just  before  the  adoption of  an important resolutlon  (tne
Moreau Report on the  IXth  Commlsslon Report on Competitlon
Pollcy)  by  the  European  Parliament,  and with  a new Commis-
sioner and a  new Director-General in  charge at  the Commls-
sion.  It  has therefore been thought appropriate to  publlsh
it,  together with  the Appendlx and the Report, as a special
brochure.
It  1s no accldent that  this  review of  cornpetttlon
pol.icy colncldes with  the most severe recession the Community
has experienced. The recesslon, together with  the critlcal
stage reached in  the  Communityrs own development, naturally
provoke reconslderation of  the  main policy  lines  fol1o{ed
hltherto  and of  the need for  change or  adJustment to  adapt
the  new clrcumstances.  The Commltteers  reflexlona  on thls
do not  questlon the  ba6lc prlnclples  set out  ln  the Treaty
of  Rome. But  they do conclude that  the  appllcation  of  the
r'rles  require  more flexibiltty  and must be carried  out  ln
tlre overall  framework  of  broad policy  guldellnes part!.cularly
regardlng industrlal  poltcy.
Competitlon,  as  the  EEC  Conrmlssloner,
Mr ANDRfESSEN,  repeated ln  the  Committee's debate, ls  not
an  end ln  ltself.  Competltion po11cy -  not,  as the Rappor-
teur,  Mr BAGLIANO, polnted out  to  be ldentifled  wlth  conpe-
titlon  ltself  -  1s a  dellcate  balance of  rnany confllctlngII
interests.  Some parts  of  the Committee's Opinion may there-
fore  appear to  the  casual reader to  be  self-evldent.  In
the  present difficult  economic and social  conditions,  lt
is  no longer easy, nor  therefore is  1t  polntless,  to  make
statements of  the obvious and thls  offlcial  text,  representa-
tive  of  a broad consensus of  views, is  therefore presented
as a highly  relevant contrlbution to  the Community's further
development ln  the difflcult  months and years ahead.A.  OPINION
of the Economlc  and Soclal Commlttee
on the
Community Competitlon  Policy 1n the Light
of the Current Economic  and Social SituationI.
-1-
coupETrTIoN  PoLI,CY {N AN "OPEN" tqAnKET rN THE PROCESS  OF
INTEGMTION
Background  to this  Opinion
The serlous  economic and social  situation  1n the
late  rTOs and early  r80s requires the Economic and Social Com-
mittee  to  put  the  Community's competition policy  under the
magnifying gIass, taklng an overall,  and above all,  long-term
view.
N.B. :  The numbers in  brackets refer  to notes (quotations from
docunents) ln  the Appendlx to thls  Oplnion.
This  1s  to  shed 11ght on  the  points  made ln  the
Oplnlon.-2-
This  Oplnion hras prompted by  the  profound  con-
viction,  born of experience, that in  a period of  such serious,
persistent social and economlc difficulties,  all  the Comnunity
policies  ought to  be implemented as effectlvely  as posslble,
with the maximum coordination and with aII  reasonable speed.
To this  end, discussion  of  the past 1s not enough;
we must also undertake a realistic,  scrupulous appraisal of
the current economlc and social situation.  Above all,  we must
adopt a more lmaglnative approach to  the future  and display
greater commj.tment  1n declslons and actlons.
A1l the policies  of the European  Communlty should be
given  this  new impetus without  delay.  This  includes  com-
petj.tion pollcy whlch has a baslc,  specific  and vlgorous role
to  play  in  a  climate characterized by a change in  econornic
relations  and  industriaL  structures,  a  concentration and
"multinationalization"  of  capital  in  certain  sectors,  and a
transformation of  relatlons  between the  State  and  the
economy.
In this  context two trends emerge : firstly  there is
the growing importance of State and semi-State firms,  stronger
pressures for  dlrect  government Aid,  and more demands for
Community  ald  or  protectlon;  secondly, stiffer  and stiffer
competition from imports orj-ginating outside the  Community.
Concurrently, ties  are  being forged more and more rapictly
with the developing countries.-.3-
It  is  not the lntentlon of  thls  Oplnion to dupllcate
the  speciflc  analyses submitted  each year by  the  European
Parliament to  the  Commisslon  for  critical  evaluation.  The
Opinion seeks to  tackle  the  problem of  competltlon policy
within  an overall  framework, vrith particular  reference to
changing eondltlons in  and outside the Community.
Instruments  and aims of the Treaty : rules on competition
Among the  many instruments  for  lnplementlng  the
objectives  set  out  in  Articte  2  of  the  Treaty,  Artlcle  3
provides  for  I'the  instltution  of  a  system ensuring that
competition ln  the common market is  not distortedrr.
The rules on competitlon (Articles  85 et.  seg. ) are
therefore one of  the  rrinstrumentsil  for  bringlng  about the
"common narket" (1).
Further,  the  establishment  of  a  common  market be-
tween the Menber States ls,  according to Article  2, a means of
"pronoting"  the obiectives of  the Treaty which are of  course:
harmonious development of economic actlvitles
an increase in  stability
an accelerated raislng of the standard of  1lv1ng (Art.2)
These are clearly  economlc and soqlal alms and lt  ls
therefore right  and expedient that rules on competltlgn  should
be  increaslngly  consldered  in  the Light of the economlc and
soclal sltuatlon.  Thls  15'  precls€ly  what  thts  gplnlon
propo€es to do.
a)
b)
c)Competitlon policy
In  the present econonic and soci.al situation,  both
in  and outside the  Community, competition rules  should  be
applied in  accordance with principles  and strategies that  are
geared to  a genuine fu1ly-fledged competition policy.  (More-
over, the whole chapte,r on "rules  on cornpetition", from rules
applying to firms to  "ieids granted by Statesr', is  contained in
Part Three of the Treaby entitled  ',Policy of the Community,,).
This is  all  the more necessary in  view of  the fact
that  the  original  frame of. reference -  the  economlc and
soclal.  situation  in  the  '60s  -  has  changed radically
(particularly  in  the  '7Os) and bearing in  mind that  "in-
tegration'r in  arrsing.[e" market is  among the primary obJec-
tives  of  the  Community, even though various  obstacles,
differences and imbalances stiLl  remain betbreen Menber States.
Even a  summary assessment of  the  '6Os reveals that
the  competition rules  were generally  applied according  to
largely  legaL criteria  (3).
After  the period of  initial  notifications,  and once
"massrrsolutions  had be.en found (the vast maJority of the teri
thousand or so contracts notified  related to exclusive distri-
butlon),  the Commission clari.fied  the lirnits  of  "co-operation"
between firms and took positlon on a number of  cases involving
abuse of  domlnant posil;ion.-5-
The lncreasing complexity of the lssues lnvolved  and
their  considerable interdependence  vis-l-vis  many other lssues
have 1n recent years obllgeCt the Commlsslon to  get to  grlps
with situations whlch call  for  value Judgments and a broader
approach to realltles,  impllcations  and constralnts.
As ls  borne out by a nrmber of  practical  exanples,
the ,rul-es on competition, refemed to in Artlcles  42' 85, 86,
92 et  seq of  the Treaty of  Rome, shoutd be inplemented more
effectlvely  vla  a  package of  measures, norms and recommen-
dations whlch are compatlble with  the overall  framework of
Community  activity  (2),  ln  other words by means of  a prgoer
'rpol+cyrr which 1s both complex, flexible  and structured,  and
takes account of  interdependence  and interactions  between  a
varlety  of  initiatives  and  situations,  both  general  and
sectoraf, within  the Community and in the world outslde.
An approach along these lines must be encouraged.
The open conmon market
The ?reaty itself  takes a clear Ilne  :
ttBy establishlng a customs union between themselves,
Member States alm to contribute, in  the common inte-
rest,  to  the harmonlous  development of  world trade,
the progressive  abolition  of  restrictions  on inter-
natlonal trade and the lovrerlng of  customs barrlers.-6-
The common commercial pol1cy shall  take i.nto account
the favourab.le effect  whi.ch the abolition  of  customs
dutles  bett^reen  Member States  may have on  the
lncrease j.n bhe cornpetltlve strength of undertakings
in  those Statesr'.  (Article  11O).
The present sltuatlon  conftrms the validity  of  this
line  and the need to  press on wj-th efforts  to  achleve these
objectives.
SlmllarIy,  t;he preamble to  the Treaty states  that
the  Community is  created in  the  desire torrcontribute,  by
means of  a  common commercial policy,  to  the  progressive
abolition  of restrictlons  on international  trade".
Leaving aside all
that  the  common market 1s
parcel of  the vaster  amblt
natlonal trade.
dogma, we must face the reality
open insofar  as it  is  part  and
of  the world econog and inter-
In  thls  connectlon the Committee fully  agrees with
the  Commission's int;roductlon  to  the  VIIIth  Report  on
Competltlon PoIlcy  :
'rTo operate effectively,  the common  market is  largely
dependent on  the  settlng-up  of  a  large  internal
narket  in  a  Community brith  an  outward-looking
approach to  the  rest  of  the world.  An extenslve
area  1n which economlc activities  rnay lntereact
wlthout  purposeless  constralnts  1s a  prerequlslte
for  a developing economy; it  is  no longer reasonable
to  suppose that  economlc actlvity  can expand wlthin
a  conflned lrpacer'.Slmllarly,
acknowledges  that  :
-7-
the  lntroduction  to  the  IXth  Report
'revery Community  po1lcy ls  required to  adapt ltself
ln  order  to  f1t  lnto  the  perspective of  a  common
market that  is  both unified  and outwanl-looking  at
the sane time".
Accordlngly,  competltlon policy  must further  the
aims of  the Treaty wlth  a vlew to  achievlng a common market
which is  not  isotated  but  open to  trade and incernatlonal
competltion 1n the wldest posslble sense (4).
II.  IT.{TERDEPENDENCE AND ITS,EFFECTS -  COMI{UNITY COMPETI-
TIVENESS
-  RELEVANT I'IARKET
World-wide lnterdependgnce  and Community comqetitiveless
The growing lnterdependence of  markets necessarlly
entalls  a new lnternati-onal dlvislon  of labour (7).
The European Conmunity feels  the  impact of  th13
interdependence more than  any other. Bloc and the  i.nltlal
practical  response to  thls  chalienge can only be an increase
and expanslon of  competltiveness,  stimulated by a competltlon
policy  compatlble with  the obJectlves of  the Treaty but also
responslve to  any adJustments  that  become necessary over tlme
(s).
In  an "openl market, a  coherent competltlon  pollcy
must be lncreaslngly orlentated  towards a.gLlgE!rylglLg!
overall,  world-wide lnterdependence (6).  Thls economlc lnter-
dependence embodles all  the  elenents  for  more balanced
North-South  and East-West relatlons'  from the  flow  of  raw
materials to trade and technologlcal flows.-8-
Rul-lng out protectlonism,  the only possible strategy
open to  us 1s to  further  the restructuring of  productlon and
structural  adjustment with the help of all  social and econonlc
interests.  At the sane time, Community industry wlll  be safe-
guarded and stlnulated  by a competition policy  conceived in
the  broadest and most dynamic terms and thus  placlng  ln-
creasing emphasis on globaI Community aims (8) (9)  (10).
However, lt  must be remembered that  terms of  compe-
tltion  1n many world export markets are often  different
sometlmes very  different -  from  those  existing  ln  the
Community. Close monitoring comblned with  suitable  measures,
posslbly transitional  or  phased, will  therefore  be needed to
prevent Community  flrms belng adversely affected.
Competition  and cooperag:!on
Slnce the European Community is  more dependent than
other  advanced  countrles  on  external  relatlons,  it  must
succeed in  introducing a system of  'rcompetltion -  cooperatlon'l
between the  Community and the .maJor non-Community Blocs in
order to  promote lastlng  North-South  and East-West  prosperity
based on the princlple  of  reasonable reciprocity  and balanced
economlc progress ln every sector.
A shrewd competition pollcy must take account of  the
need to reconclle competitlon and cooperation 1n both
productlon and trade.  Distortions  within  the  common rnanket
must be  avoided, unfair  practices  must be  prevented and
worthwhlle cooperatlon compatlble with the Communltyts overall
progress  must be promoted.-9-
Relevant ,rnarket
This trend in  the  Communlty  and international  eco-
nomies requires -  in  addition to  the criterion  of  ilpractlces
which  may  affect  trade  between  Member  Statesrr
(Article  g5(1)) -  a broader criterion  which effectively  takes
into  account the relations  between the "communlty narket[ as a
whole and other countries.
We should therefore approve and encourage  the ten-
dency of  the commission and the court of  Justice to  conslder
Article  85 as applicable to agreements affecting  the Community
betweencompanieswhoseregiSteredofficesareoutsldethe
Member States. (11).
I,lhile  lt  is  thus essential and correct  from every
pointofviewtoevaluatetheanti-competitiveeffectsof
agreements between Community businesses and those of  other
countries, it  is  equally necessary and conrect, not to confine
the  analysis  of  a  specific  market situation  (production'
sa1es, substltute  or  simllar  products, etc')  to  the  conmon
market a1one.
The assessment  of  the
of  considerable imPortance for
and 86 (12).
'rrelevant  market" 1s of  course
the application of Articles  85-10-
As part  of  this  assessment, an increasingly  careful
analysis must be made of  the position of individual  companies
with respect both to their  competitors in  the Conmunlty and to
import flows from outside the Community.  Assessments of  the
competitive position and the relevant market cannot be artifi-
cia11-y confined to the Community area.
This  is  the  only  way to  make the  concept of  an
'ropen'r common  market effective,  complete and coherent.
Competition policy  is  already moving in  this  dlrec-
tion  and must be glven every encouragement  to do so.
III.  IMPORTANCE  OF THE ECONOMIC  AND SOCIAL  CONTEXT -  COORDINA-
TION 0F CgMMUNTTY  POLTCTES
Impact of economic  and social aspects
The aims of  the Treaty emphasize the  economlc  and
social aspects.
The economic recession  and inflationary  pressures
bedevilling  aI1 the Mr:mber States today, the need to protect
employment, the  need to  plomote technological progress and
innovation, the contlnuj.ng o11 crisis  and the disparities  in
natlonal  legislatlon  in  a  number of  key sectors are  all
factors,  to  name but the most important, which must be taken
into  account 1n assesslng the behavlour of  firms  and Member
States wlth a viel{ to  the appllcatlon of  Articles  85, 86, 92
et.  seq.-  11 -
Competition policy  cannot be governed by abstract or
theoretical  criterla  but  must take  into  account the  real
conditions  and requirements  of  the  varlous  countries  and
regions  (13).  The origlnal  frame of  reference (settlng  ln
motion of  an  integratlon  process in  a  hlgh  growth-rate
economy)  whlch rnarked the lnitlal  period of implementatlon of
the rules of competition has now changed.
The tnaJor changes in  the Community and i-nternational
economies over  the  last  few  years  have had serious  re-
percussions ln  the  soclal  and  productive  sectors  of  a
Community whtch 1s not yet fully  integrated  (14).
Glven this  state of affairs,  appllcation of  the com-
petition  rules  cannot disregard economig and soclal  lnstltu-
tions  and factors.  Account must therefore be taken of  the new
"framework  conditions"  governing a1I  facets  of  Community
development  ( 15) .
For  this  reason the  Commlssion should inform and
consult employersr associations  and trade unions ln particular
about  its  competltion  policy.  The  Economic and  SociaI
Committee  is  an ideal  forum for  brlefing  and consulttng  all
soclo-economic interest  groups on this  matter.
Jglation,  soaial pro
The hallmarks of  the present economic and soclal
sltuatign  lnclude Persistent  inflation,  rislng  unernploJrment-t2-
and the  nwnerous effects  of  the  energy crisls.  Competltlon
policy  must therefore pay special heed to  these vltal  aspecta
of the present economlc sltuatlon.
A  vigorous competition policy  can also  help  to
contain lnfIatlon,  for  lnstance by rati.onalizing  production
and promotlng  labour and capital  mobillty,  wlth coFesponding
benefits  in  costs and prlces.  Stricter  controls  can check
abuses and elimlnate the varlous artlflcial  constralnts  whlch
dlstort  competition  (16).
On the socla1 front,  the re-distrlbutlon  of  labour
wlthln  the  Communlty  should be orlentated towards expandlng
sectors.  The  alignment  (tZ'1  of  social  security  systems
(18) should also be pursued more vigorously, without ignoring
the  Lmportance of  the  dlfferent  traditlons  of  lndustrlal
relatlons,  particular.ly  in  the  context  of  Communlty en-
I argement.
Competition policy  should al.so keep a close watch on
the  wlde dlsparitles  Ln energy prices  in  the Member States
(19).  It  ls  vltal  to  lloster tax ali.gnment  and promote greater
lnternatlonal. cooperatlon 1n this  area ln  order to  pemlt  a
more  accurate  assessment of  needs and  strlke  a  more
satlsfactory balance between supply and demand.-13-
Rullncs of the Court of Justlce
The Commission and Court of  Justice  have already
shown their  responsiveness  to  socio-economlc  needs .(23).  Thls
is  both a reallstic  and far-sighted policy.
These institutions  . have,  for  example, recognlzecl
that  the foJ.Iowing consideratlons  should be taken into  account
when defining  the  "promotion of  technical  or  economlc
progress" (Articre  85(3))  :
a) the scope for  (i)  plannlng productlon and marketing on a
long-telm basis and wlth greater accuracy, (fi;  restrictlng
the  market fluctuations,  and (iii)  lowering productlon'
storage and marketing  costs;
b) the  protection  of  enployment  as  part  and par'ce1 of  an
overalf  stabilization  p1an, especlally  when the  buslness
climate is  gloomy (20).
The Court  -  while  acknowledging that  lworkable
competition"  (21)  is  a  sina  qua non -  has also  stated
expllcltly  that  competltion may vary in  nature and lntenslty
according to  the partlcular  products or  servlces in  questlon
end according to  the  economlc structure  of  the  sectors
concerned. The Court has also  ruled  that  prlce  competltlon
should not  be glven absolute priorlty  in  aII  clrcumstances
(22) .-L4-
These decislons show an awareness  that rules on corn-
petltion  cannot be applied 1n a vacuurn but are lnfluenced by
the  economlc and soclal context exlstlng  at  any glven moment
1n tlme.
Above all,  1t  1s  clear that  in  practlce  the
conditions under which Communlty flms  operate dlffer  fron
Member State  to  Member State  ln  respect of:  access (to
domestlc and lnternatlonal  financial  facilitles;  the  labour
market; research and development), scale of  productlon  and
marketing;  taxatlon  and  social  security  rules;  lnfra-
structure;  transport  and energy supplies.
To make its  full  lmpact, a competition pollcy  needs
to  be carefully  researched and take account of  the varlous
factors  lnvolved, whlle  at  the  sarne tlme seeking to  create
condltions truly  conducive to the changes required.
Coordlnatlon of pof lctes
If  there  is  agreement on  an  overall  approach,
lnterdependence and the need to  take into  account the  cons-
traints  imposed by the widely differing  economic and social
sltuatlons  wlthln  the Communlty, then, if  the obJectlves of
the Treaty are to  be achieved, there must also be agreement
that  undlstorted competitlon within  the Community  is  a pre-
regulslte  for  aclJustlng lndustrlal  structures  which  ln-
creaslngly come lnto  contact wlth  one another ln  an  open
market.-15-
Framed along these Iines,  a conpetitlon policy will
spur  Community firms  to  be more competitive and further  a
bold,  far-slghted  strategy of  industrial  restmcturing  whose
main concern w111 be to  relnforce the Communityrs industrial
structures.
What is  absolutely  necessary is  cLose coordinatlon,
particularly  with  overall  sectoral  and industrial  policies'
with  the social,  regi.onal and conmercial policies  of the Com-
munity (24), and with the Common Agricultural  Policy.
The Commission  has shown in  a number of  cases that
it  has done just  that  (25).
Its  1978 and  L979 prograrnmes concentrated  on
structural  aid  for  ailing  industries  (stee1,  shipbuilding,
textiles,  footwear, paper).  In  addltlon,  the Commlsslon  has
issued  detalled  reports  and  varlous  other  inltlatives
concentrating  on "growth sectorsl designed to pronote economl.c
expansion and thereby increase Job opportunities in  tndustry
and  the  tertiary  sector  (alternatlve  energy sources'  the
alrcraft  Lndustry,  telecommunlcatlons,  data-processing,  efec-
tronics).
Competltlon  policy  should encourage a  coordinated
target-orlentated approach to  and settlement of  such problems.
Reglonal  lmbalances  and restructurlng
It  ls  also essential to prevent the restructurlng of
productlve lndustrles  from bej.ng hampered by  lnstltutlonal
infl exlbl ll ty.-16-
The most serious and crucial  examples  of  institu-
tional  inflexlbillty  are related to regional imbalances  ln  the
Communl ty.
Cornpetltion pollcy  at  regional  level  must, on the
one hand, respect the need for  specific priori.ties  but,  on the
other,  must help to  lncorporate regional re-equilibrlum  and
development needs into  an overall  policy,  having_a social
dlmenslon  ln order to prevent confllcts  or delays.
If  the  socio-economic  background  is  to  be  taken
serlousLy, competltion policy  should be geared to  general or
medlun-term goals and should observe the principles  of gradua-
lism and conslstency. Coordination and harmonlzation  should be
entrusted Jointly  to  senior offlclals  in  the ceneral Direc-
torates  directly  concerned. This would make it  possible to
hold comprehensive disrcussions and assessments before Commls-
slon declslons are taken (26).
IV. !,trxEp EcoNqMy -  FULL INFORMATION  -  ArpS
Mlxed economy
It  is  generally  recognlzed  that,  to varying degrees
and ln  varylng forms, the pubtic  sector is  an ever-present
feature of modern economles.
In  some Member States,  this  interwentlon  has
deep-seated hlstorical,  soclo-politlcal  roots and, in a number
of uays, lnfluences natlonal economlc and politlcal  declsionB.-L7-
At  a1l  events, it  is
States have, even lf  to  varying
considerable  tlme  1n econ6ic
semi-State  bodles.
now a fact  that  many Member
degrees, been involved for  a
activity,  thrbugh State  and
The Member States have an undeniable right  to pursue
economic and social  advance through the  vehicle  of  such
bodl es .
However, competition rules  must operale  even 1n
mixed economles, except of  course where the notion of  I'public
service'r of  speciflc  general interest  is  concerned (Art.  9O.2
of the Treaty).
Here lt  1s hardly surprising that  the issue of like
treatment of  private  and public-sector firats  competing  in  the
same market (27),  so crucial  to  the proper operation of  the
economy as a  whole, should have arisen.  The only  means of
ensurlng  such  treatment  is  to  eliminate  any  flscal  or
financial  discrlminatlon  and to  dispense with  preferential
amangements and measures of equivalent effect.
Competltlon  poI1cy has a crucial  role  here.
Full  lnformatlon
The direct  or indirect  allotment of publlc resourceE
to  publlc-sector  fltms,  and the way such resources are used,
must not  be  shrouded in  secrecy. The recent  Cornmlssion
Directlve on thls  matter is  a step ln  the rlght  dlrectton.-18-
Thls requirement  must not be interpreted or applied
so  as  to  lead  to  discrimination  between public  and
private-sector  firms.  It  mereLy reflects  the princlple  that
public-sector  firms  must  also  be  required  to  disclose
appropriate partlculars  about their  financlal  relations  wlth
the  State,  even thor"rgh this  information is  not  demanded by
shareholders  (29).
Identical  market condltions for  public  and prlvate-
sector fims  wl1l  facilltate  non-dlstorted,  increased compe-
tition.  Where social  factors -  at  the  1evel  of  an
establlshment,  region or  sector -  take precedence, convlncing
grounds should be provided along with a schedule for  phaslng
out relief  measures o,yer a reasonable period of  time.
It  should  be  made clear  that  the  derogations
accorded to  a  number of  sectors for  an initial  period  are
merely temporary.  The requirenent that full  information should
be glven should be extended as soon as possible to  cover the
credit,  lnsurance and energy dlstributlon  sectors.
Competition policy an(t aids
The ban on aids laid  down in  principle  by Article
92(1 )  must be  observed, but  current  economic and soclal
clrcunstances 1n the  Comnunlty require  a  new look  at  the
lnterpretatlon  and appllcation  of  this  ban. In  partlcular,
Artlcle  92(3) must be applled consistently  and with increaslng
slringency, account being taken of  the purpose of aids and of
speclflc natlonal or  regional circunstances.-19-
Hohlever, since many factors  are involved'  it  would
be helpful  if  the Member States and firms  recelved regulart
detailed updates on the Treaty-compatibllity criteria  adopted
by  the  Commission in  the  light  of  changing general and
sectoral circumstances in  the Community  economy' Rather than
encouraglng  applicatlons for  State ald,  fuller  dlsclosure of
compatibility  criteria  could preclude concealed aid  schemes
and help to  ensure that  aids are consistent with Treaty aims
at  al-1 levels  (natlonal ano tocal)  (3O).
In  addition  to  straightforward  alds,  which  are
direct  and declared, there is  also the problem of  partial  or
ful.l  reimbursement of  capital  expenditure undertaken by
private-sector  firms  for  a  variety  of  purposes' including
R & D.
Community  lndustry  cannot  overcome the  present
recessLon  unless it  shatpens lts  competitlveness'  Competltlon
po1lcy  must  therefore  allow  adeguate  support  for  R & D'
especially  to enable Comnunity fims  to compete on equal tems
with  their  rivals  in  non-Member  countries,  some of  whom have
speciflc  lncentives for  R & D.
Condltions conducive to  stepping up competltlveness
ean be achleved in  thls  way.
Here agaln, there should always be a proper flow of
j.nformation, and it  should be possible  to  demand equally
detalled  partlculars  of  speclal  relatlons  between
private-sector  flrms  and banks or  flnanclal  consortia wlth
publlc backlng.-20-
V. BUSINESS PRACTICES
The fragmentation and decentralizatlon  of productive
investment, which is  already under way in  some sectors and
desirable in  others, together with  the increaslng rigidi.ty  of
constraints  and structrrres conditloning the behaviour of  large
firms,  suggest that  competition po11cy should do more to
safegu:rrd free  access to  the market, to preclude abuse and to
further  cooperation not only  between small and medium fims,
but also between the latter  and large firms  (31).
The Commission  has already moved in  this  direction
by ellmnating a number of technical, adninistrative  and legis-
lative  barriers  and by encouraging  cooperation between, in
particular,  small and medium firms.  The small/medium business
sector is  more flexiblLe than the large business sector,  and
adapts more readily to changing market requirements  and to  the
many variables of risk  and lnnovation.
The large  number of  small and medium firrns,  their
geographical  dispersion and the enterprising spirit  of  their
managers are  likely  to  stimulate cornpet:ition and glve  con-
sumers  (particularly  specific  categories  of  consumers)
posslbj.lities  of  a  uride choice and easy availability  of
suppl ies.
However, though it  should be possible to upgrade  the
role  of  the  smalf/medlum  business sector,  by  providi.ng
approprlate support  and incentives,  tfris  should be  done
wlthout lmpalring free cornpetition.
Whlle their  slze  makes lt  easier for  SMEs to  adapt
rapldly  and relatlvel],  cheaply to  changlng market needs, it
also make8 them more rrulnerable  in  respect of  access to  the-2L-
capital  market, supplies and any unfair  economic and trade
practices.  It  is  therefore necessary' in  the  interests  of
maintaining  an undistorted and workable competitlon system' to
protect  SMEs against such practices through adequate legis-
latlve  and administrative measures as well  as through lega1
means. At  the same time the notlon of  "sectoral markets  con-
cerrredrr should be made to work more to  the advantage of  SMEs
when evaluating the competitive posltion of bigger firms'
As a result  of  lncreasing difficulties  in  adJusting
to changing conditlons of cornpetition, both in  and outslde the
Community,  it  will  be  necessary for  large  flrms  to  make
considerable efforts  to  reorganize their  structures and pro-
duction and to adopt a new strategy on vertical  and horlzontal
cooperatlon for  the purpose of  cuttlng  back expendlture  and
achieving  optimum efficiency;  however, one nust not lgnore the
need for  effective  controJ-s, glven the dangers that can result
from productive or financlal  mergers.
There are,  however, stil1  many legislative  and tax
obstaclestothemostefficientformsofinter-firmcoopera-
tion  1n the flelds  of both R & D and services'
The Draft  Regulation on the "exemption by category"
of  patent llcence agreements should  further  simplify  the
,rpplication of  Articfe  85(3).  It  should ensure greater legal
clarity  and certainty  and should create  a  more favourable
cllmate for  R & D and the transfer of  technologles  (32) '
Far from dlscouraglng flrms  from concludlng llcence
agreements' the  new Regulatlon should ensure that  "patentsfi
and i'industrlal  property" are harnessed to  competitlon  and to
technologlcal and economlc advance.-22-
A11 flrms irrespective of  thelr  size,  should be able
to  participate  in  the  exchange of  technology and know-how'A
more active  licence  market, with  a  system that  adequately
protects property rights,  is  -  together with approprlate re-
search incentives -  a sine qua non for  faster  innovatlon.
In  the  diqlrlbutlon
should put particular  emphasis on
Ilze  channels and methods  and
inflate  reta11 prices.
The variety of  types
existence of  the smalf/medlum
guarded.
sector,  competltion  PolicY
the primary need to rationa-
preclude abuses that  could
of marketing, and the continued
business sector, must be safe-
When exclusive dealing  arrangements and selectlve
dlstribution  systems are being consi.dered,  due weight should
be given to  their  corlstructlve  contribution in  sectors where
there are obJectlve reasons for  a high-grade.,  well-organized
distribution  system 1lnked inter  alia  to  the nature of  the
product (33) and the responsibllities  of  the producer.
-  In  connection with  the restructuring  of  indlvidual
sectors and firms,  th{l present  economlc situation  in  the Com-
munlty ls  such that  the walvers provided for  in Artlcle  85(3)
should, untl1  a  satlsfactory  balance has been restored'  be
applled to  partial  agreements  (even between business rivals)
designed to  enhance the participants'  competitiveness and es-
peclally  thelr  abiltlty  to  compete wi.th  non-Community
flrme (34).-23-
Close monitoring will  be necessary at  all  times to
prevent abuses of  domlnant positions.
With regard to  buslness mergers, one must remember
that  if  1egal instruments lack the requisi.te flexlbillty  and
phasing j-n both conceptlon and lmplementatlon, their  practical
impact will  vary from Member State to Member State.
In  partlcular  one should remember that  market and
productive-capacity structures,  and  hence the  Ievels  of
mergers., differ  from Member State to  Member State for  histo-
rica1,  economic and social reasons.
Business mergers should be vetted,  though many cyc-
lical  and structural  factors,  including at  the present tlme
employment difficultj.es,  mllitate  in  favour of  policles  free
of  1egal and other rlgidities.  (35) (96)
The Draft Regulatlon currently being examlnecl by the
council might be a satisfactory  frame of reference insofar as
it  takes realistic  account of  the many and varled aspects of
the problem.  (g?)
The consultatlon  and approval procedures for  the
company law directives which are sti11  in  the pipe-line  should
b)  speeded up.  Hovrever, it  lvou1d be wrong to  try  to  resolve
all  the problems  at  one So (gS) (39).
fnter  alia,  the Commlsslon  shoulct stress the lmpor-
tance of  adoptlng the Draft  Regulation  on the creation of  a
European  Cooperatlon Group, which in many lnstances would be a
useful lega1 vehlcle.  (4O)-24-
Tfre propedures for  applying competition  rules  to
flrms,  and the  tlme  they  take  to  complete, have a  direct
impact on costs,  because they protract  legal uncertainty and
are detrlmental to the lnterests of the parties.
A  speeding-rrp  of  procedures could held  to  reduce
this  uncertainty,  though accurate analysis and optimal decl-
slon-rnaklng remain as.essential  as ever.
The overall  legal  framework should be reformed by
providlng for  better  access to  fiIes,  mone respect for  infor-
mation, the confident.lal nature of  certain documents' appro-
priate  delays for  reply,  oral  evidence, greater preclslon of
complaints  and provlsion of  ful1er information and reasons fon
declsions. (4t)  (42)
Thought shorrld also be glven to  ways of  ensurlng
more obJective decis.lon-naking  and informati.on 1n  matters
where no formal decislons have been taken.
Keeping tabs on the fairness of  company @ggigi-gg
1s also a valicl instrument of  competition po1lcy. (43)
The  Court  of  Justice  has  in  varlous  rullngs
conflrmed  that  the prohibitlons  set out  in Articles  85 and 86
are directly  appllcab:le  ln  national provisions; by now there
j.s  more or  less  gerreral agreement on the  princlple  that
Communlty law takes precedence over national Iaw.
Although growing harmonization  between natlonal and
Communlty law dimlnlghes the  theoretical  risk  of  conflict,
national laws (even lf  not developed to the sane degree i.n-25-
each lt{ember State) should provide the necessary  back-up via  a
decentralized and effectlve  competltion  policy  whi.ch does not
exclude close cooperation between the lr{enber States. (44)
VI .  CONSU!,IER  PROTECTION
Competition pollcy  is  complenentary to,  and closely
Iinked wlth,  a Community policy on consumer protectlon.  (47)
Information  and market transparency generally,  are
essential i.f  consumers -  and firms  -  are to be able to  make
the proper cholce. Hovrever, i.nformation should not be provided
exclusively  by  suppllers;  the  consumer must be  able  to
evaluate alternatlves  wlthin  the  framework of  a system whlch
is  more rational  and balanced than the present one.
It  is  particularly  important to  supply lnformatlon
on prices  stnce these are  the  consumerts  maln indlcator  of
rislng  inflatlon.
However, competltlon
to create the prerequislte for
prlces  for  comparable and
market. (45)
pollcy  alone cannot be expected
achlevlng uniform or equivalent
rival  products  wlthln  the
Tax structures vary, widely and so do the productlon
situatlons of indlvldual  flrms,  distribution  amangementa'  and
sales po1lcles.  (46)
However, those responslble for  competltion pol.lcy,
especlally where inexplicably  large differences are found to
exlst,  should  keep  prlces  under  close  revlert.  Prlce
dlfferences  are not ln  themselves proof of  such nalpnactlces,
nor  do  they  necessarlfy indlcate  that  barrlers  to  trade
contlnue  to  extst  or  that  markets  have  not  been
tntegrated. (48)-26-
VII.  CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOP!{ENT OF A COMPETITION POLICY
In an rropentt competltlon situation,  like  that  ln  the
Communlty,  1t  is  necessary to  pursue an "open" competltlon
pollcy,  that  ls  to  say a flexlble,  overall,  reallstic  and dy-
narnlc policy  that  takes  account of  changlng social  and
economic  circumstances 1n  the  Communlty, of  lnternational
trade patterns, and of  economlc and productlon trends outslde
the EEC that influence the Communlty,s relatlons wlth the rest
of the world.
However, 1t  ls  hardly posible to  claim the beneflts
of  free trader and thus of  healthy and effectlve  competitlon,
wlthout accepting the constralnts,  ranglng from falr  prlcing
and advertlslng  to  abstentlon from agreements and abuslve
practices which vlolate  the prlnciples of non-distorted compe-
tlt1on  or  the  speclfic  antl-trust  rules  of  the  Community,
lndlvldual Member States and regional areas. (49)
Monitorlng,  therefore,  though not an end ln  ltself,
1s essentlal.
A Communlty competltlon poli.cy must also  safeguarrl
effectlve  competitlon betyreen products and services wlthln  the
Common l{arket. But, pa:ntlcularly  in relatj.ons with the rest  of
the  world,  1t  must  also  preclude abnorfial competltion,
dunplng, malpractices, concealed  protectionlst  retallatLon  and
any dlstortlon  of the terms of  competitlon.
At  internatl.onal  leveI,
ensure that  antl-trust  .ru1es ln
dlstort  competltlon. Cooperation
would be helpful here. (5O)
steps should be taken to
non-EEC countrles  do not
betneen the  Member  States-27-
Generally speaking, an intelligent  Community policy
-  based on a close and continuing review of  changes ln  the
lnternatlonal  division  of  labour and resources -  can do much
to  contain inflationary  pressures and high unemployment, and
leave adequate  room for  competltlon and collaboration  bet$/een
firms both ln  and outslde the Communlty.
ldlth thls  end ln mlnd, effective  coordinatlon of  the
dlfferent  Communlty pollcies  must be a  priorlty  to  ensure
conpliance  with the aims of  the Treaty and mutual consistency;
national sectoral policles  should show simiiar  convergence and
cornpatibllity.  (52)
FinaLIy,  the  Commlsslon's  resources should  be
boosted so as to  lrnprove the efficlency  of  its  services. The
Commission  w111 then be able to  play  to  the full  its  vita1,
unlque role  in  the constructlon  of  a forward-looking  Europe.
(s1) (s3)-28-
APPENDIX
to  the
OPINION
of  the
Economlc  and Soclal Committee
I.  COMP,ET,ITION  POLICY TN AN OPEN MARKET IN fHE PROCESS  OF
INTEGRATION
(1)  In  the  flrst  t'Report on Competirion policy,r  back
1n  L97I  the  Commlsslon  acknowledged that  the  competitlon
pollcy:
rris  an  lmportant  lnstrument  for  furthering  the
aims of the Treaties. "
(Report -  Introductlon  -  Page 1, sub-section  2)
(2)  Calllng for  a wlder scope for  the EEC's competltlon
policy,  the European Parllament  :
tt2.  stresses, however, the need for  the Comrnission
to  extend t;he scope and appLlcatlon of  its  com- petltlon  pol1cy  to  ensure that  the  whole rlange of Communlty actlvlty  1s covered;
3.  urges the  Comnlssion,  therefore,  to  conslder
how competition  pollcy  mlght fruitfully  be applied to such dlverse areas as social policy,  the approxl- matlon of  laws,  the  relations  between the  EEC and  state-t;radlng  countrles,  the  accesslon of
new Member States, the common.agricultural  policy, flshlng pol1cy, and the law of  the Sea;
4.  regrets  the  absence from  the  Flfth  Report of  any nentlon of  the competitlon  aspects of energy pol1cy, of  consuner protectlon,  of  credit  instttu- tlons,  of  the  relatlonship  between  Community and natlonal  Iaw,  or  of  lndustrlal  pol1cy,  flelds ln  whlch competltlon po11cy clearly  has a  role to  play  and to  which the  European  parllarnent has referred 1n prevlous resolutlona.  tt.29-
(Resolution  of  the European Parliament on the Fifth
neport of the Commisslon on Competltion  PoIicy'  O'J'
No. C 238 of  11.10.76).
(3) On the appllcation of  the rules on competition,  the
European  Parliament  :
(4)
rr4.  considers that,  to be comprehenslve,  competitlon
pollcy  should not be confined solely to the applj'ga-
iion  --  to  which the Commissi.on  rlghtly  devotes its
efforts  -  of  the rules of  competition laid  down ln
the  Treaties,  but  should also  comprise . greater
equalization of  the condltions of  competition  as a
whole; "
(Resolution of  the EP on the Seventh Report 9f  th9
Commisslon on Competitlon Policy,  OJ No' C 261 of
6.11.78) .
The European  Parliament also  :
't10.  Conslders  that  the  Communlty's competitlon
policy  must be viewed not merely in  an intra-Com-
irunity context, but also in  the light  of  the need to
ensur; that  undertakings are able to  compete effec-
tlvely  and on an equal footing with  thtrd-  country
rnanufac turers. rl
(Draft Resolution of  the EPrs Economic and Monetary
iommittee on the European  Automobile fndustry :  Doc'
EP 68.264/A of 5.11.80).
rI.  TNTERDEPENDENCE  AND TTS EFFECTS  -  CoMMUNTTY  COM-
PETITIVENESS  -  RELEVANT MARKET
.s) Commlssioner DAVICNoN ansvrered parliamentary
questlon by saYing :(6)
appr.oach
-30-
"The Commisslon lntetprets  the  concept of  competi-
tlveness  as  the  ability  of  a  business to  meet
competltlon fron  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  the
economies Ilke  that  of  the  Community -  open to
internatlonal  trade bhe concept implies  the
constant  adaptation  of  businesses  to  economlc
change and  to  market conditions  and  prospects
so that,  irr  the long run,  recelpts cover the cost
of  production with  an adequate margin for  invest-
ment and return  on capital,  and ensure the conti-
nuity of the buslness.
The Conmisslon ls  aware of  the fact  that buslnesses
have to  contend with  several  factors  they  can
do  litt1e  or  nothing  to  alter.  Examples are  a
country's  laws,  international  commitments,  the
distortion  of  competition in  the rnarket and mone-
tary  pollcy.  Yet  these are  facts  of  Ilfe  that
have to  be  allowed for,  particularly  at  a  time
of  lncreasl.ng  economlc interdependence, and busl-
nesses must; respond by  increasing the  efficlency
of the factors of production."
(Written  question No. 562/8O in  OJ No. C 283 of
3.11.l.980 "'Ihe concept of  competition  as understood
by the Comm:ission").
The EP had the following to  say about the "overal.Irl
" (ii)  ry>mings
10.  In  splte of  the progress made, the Community's
competltion poltcy  as outlined  in  the Fifth  Report
remalns in  many ways insufficient,  particularly
in  this  perli.od of  change.
A  less  legalistic  view of  competition  policy
should go  beyond scrutiny  of  the  appllcation  of
Artlcles  85-94 of  the  Treaty and include  a  more
comprehensirre approach which  is  unfortunately
lacking  in  the  Community cornpetition  report.  It
seems that  ',yhen the scope and functions of  competl-
tion  pol1c5r are  considered, its  effects  are  or
could be wicler than the Comrnission thlnks.-31  -
12.  As far  as relati.ons between the EEC and third
countrles  are  n
of-6@titlon  policy  shourd be  made as part  of
an overall  study of  thr  EEC's commercial pollcy.
Consideration of  competitlon  po11cy cannot  be
disassoclated  from  consideration of  varlous  very
important problems upon whlch  the  Fifth  Report
does not expand at a11."
(Report of  the EP's Economic and Monetary  Committee
on  the  Fifth  Commission Report  on  Competltion
Pollcy -  Doc. EP No. 243/76 of  1.9.76).
(7)  The Commission has
the  lnternational  division  of
the danger of protectlonisn  :
the  following  to  say  about
Iabour,  interdependence  and
'rThe Community was designed by  the  Treaty to  be
.partlcularly  outward-looking vls-A-vis  the  r€st
of  the world.  Wlth an estimated 3096 share 1n world
trade,  1t  is  the  world's  najor  trading  partner.
The age-old  internatlonal  dlvision  of  labour
rav'. mdterials/lndustrlalized  products -  1s  pro-
gressively,  and sometimes rapldly'  belng replaced
by  a  new redlstrlbutlon  of  actlvitles  as  nore
and more developlng countrles  become Lnternatlo-
natly competitive ln  an increasing range of manufac-.
tured  products.  Technologlcal,  lndustrial  and
commerclal lnterdependence  marches steadily  oD,
even when economlc difficulties  are widespread.
It  is  partlcularly  important for  the  Communlty'
as  a  naJor  importer  and exporter,  that  an  open
system of  world  trade  based on  fair  conpetltlon
should be fostered.  The Commission  has consistently
made use of  lts  powers that  are directly  appllcable
against  flrms  to  pursue the  struggle  against re-
strictlve  practlces at international  level.
Trunlng,  then,  to  the  external  aspects of  the
Cgmmlsslgn's wgrk gn comPetitlonr the  flrst  steP
was to  establlsh  that  restrlctive  or  abusive prac-
tlces  orlglnating  outslde the Communlty are covered
by  the  Communlty rules  of  competltion where they
have an appreclable. effect  within  the  common  mar-
ket.  In  dolng sor  the  Commlsslon has become  orie
of  the first  sntl-trust  authorlties  to  have applled
effectiveLy  the  theory  of  internal  effect  ao  as
to  lmpose penaltles on forelgn companles, especial--52-
1y multinatlonals and foreign signatories .of .volun-
tiry  restra.lnt  agreements. AIl  firms  wishlng  to
opeiate insj.de thi  common market must respect lts
rules of  fair  conduct.
The Commlsslon looks to  its  competitlon policy  to
provlde  it  with  effective  means of  keeplng the
common market open to  foreign trade,  and thereby to
safeguarrC  the  Iiberal  nature  of  the  Communlty's
comm6rcial  pol1cy.  This  latter  poticy  provldes a
substantial  buttress  against the  risk  of  a rlslng
tide  of  world  protectionism,  from  which  the
Communlty, as  the  worldrs major trading  partner'
would be the flrst  to suffer.rl
(Introduction  to  the  Eighth Commission Report on
Competltlon Pollcy -  pp. 13 and 14).
In the introduction to the Sixth Report, the Commis-
sion said categorlca1IY that  :
t'wi1ling1y or unwlllingly,  Europe 1s in  the throes of
a long-1snn process of structural  transformation and
must iomehow restore.  some kind of equilibrlum  within
a new international division of  labour.'l
(8) This concepjl was ful1y  illustrated  by Commissioner
VOUEL in  his  introdutctory  speech to
Economic and Monetary Commlttee on
Competltlon PoIlcy)  :
the  work of  the  EP's
the  Eighth  Report on
"Even i.f  Community competition should not be regarded
as an aLm ln  ltself,  it  is  still  undoubtedly one of
the  fundamental pillars  of  an  open economy' -as advocated  by  the  Treaties,  a  vital  instrument for
ensuring, w.lthin a market economy' that  industrlal
struetures are pennanently  compatible with  economlc
development.
Competitlon policy  must therefore reslst  protectio-
nlst  tendencles and must set itself  up against those
who believe that immedlate problems  can be solved by-33-
artificial  protection and that  there can be protec-
tlon  in  the long term against international  compe-
tltion  and  i.ntra-Community competltlon.  Such a I'withdrawal"  slrnptom is  untenable in  an interde-
pendent world  economy where the  Community  must
look  to  the  future  wj.th open frontiers  so .as not
to lay itself  open to the risk  of suffocation.
ft  1s  therefore  the  task  of  the  Commission  to
preserve a  balance between the  malntenance or
long-term  recovery of  .Conmunity competition  on
the  one hand, and the  pursult  of  more immediate
priorities  such as  growth, the  reduction of  un-
employrnent  and  indLlstrial  restructuring  on  the
other.rl
(e) For more material  on the concept of  rrinterdepen-
Thlrd  World Countrles, dence" with  partlcular  reference to
see :
"Communaut6 -  Tlers  Monde :  1e d6fi  de  I'inter-
d6pendance"  (Bulletin  de  renseignements doclunen-
taires  -  A num6ro sp6cia1, Bruxelles, 1980)."
( 10) "Understanding the  concept  of " interdependence"
is  the title  of  a paragraph in  Chapter III  of  the well-knovrn
BRANDT report  :  rtNorth-South -  A  progranme for  survlval'l
-  f YOU.
(11)
ruling:
In  1973 the  Court of  Justice  made the  followlng
[Communlty 1aw is  applicable  to  a  transaction
whlch  lnfluences  market  conditi.ons within  the
Communlty  irrespective  of  the  questlon  whether
the  business in  question  ts  establlshed  wlthin
the  temltory  of  one of  the  Member States of  the
Communlty.  "
(Judgment of  the  Court of  Justice  of  21 February
1973, case 6-72
Europemballage Cooperation and  Contlnental  Can
Company against'European  Community
(.Report of  Cases before the  Court,  1973 -  vol.  2
-  page 216 -  maxim No. 5).-.34 -
(12)  fn  the  same Judgment (11)  the  Court of  Justice
underllned the  lmportance of  the  concept of  'rrelevant mar-
ketrr :
'rFor the  appralsal  of  LSW's dominant position  and the consequences of  the disputed merger, the defl- nition  of  the  relevant  narket  is  of  essential slgnlficance,  for  the possibilitles  of  competltlon
can only be Judged 1n relation  to those characterls-
tlcs  of  the  products in  question by  virtue  of whlch those products are particularly  apt to satis- fy  an inelastlc  need and are  only  to  a  linited
extent interchangeable  with other products.rr
IIT.  IMPORTANCE  OF THE ECONOIi{IC  AND SOCIAL  CONTEXT -  COORDI-
NATION OF COMITIUNITY  PoIiIcIEs
(13) In  the
tition  Pollcy,  the
intr'oductlon to  the Sixth Report on Compe-
Commission recognized that  :
rrThe princlple  of  competition,  so  baslc  to  the
comnon market,  1s  therefore  by  no  means rigld or dogmatic.  'l
(fa)  The Commisslon  began the introduction  to  the Ninth
Report on Competltlon  pollcy wlth the following words  :
',The perslstence of  conditions  of  crisis  prompts questions asi to  the  role  that  competitlon 
- pollcy should play  and as  to  the  respectlve merits  of rigidlty  and flexibility  in  its  applicatj.on.  fn the  case o:f  the  Community, ctetlniatlon  of  the general  thrust  of  lts  competition pollcy  must not  be based on a  dogmatic approach but. rlquires reference back to  the  fundarn-ental  provisions  of the  EeC Treaty.  The Treaty  stipulaies  that  the Communl.tyra prlmary  task  is,  bt  establishing  a
common market, to  promote the harmonious develop_ ment .of  economlc actlvLtles  throughout the  Com_ munlty.  The nethods prescribed for  accomplishingthls  task  include  the  institutlon  of  a  system for  ensuring undistorted competition, a  prerequi.-
stte  for  the  proper  functianlng  of  the  common
market, which is  the rock on whlch econornlc inte- gration is  to be founded.
It  follows  that  the Comrnunity's  competition policy
must persist  in  its  pursuit  of  a  group of  baslc
objectives.  I'
(fS)  Later  on  (page 1O) the  Commission introduces  the
concept of  fairness in  the market place :
says :
"Thirdly,  the  competition  system instituted  by the  Treaty  requires  that  the  conditiong  under
hich  competltlon takes  place  remaln subject  to
the  principle  of  fairness  in  the  market p1ace.
In  the  Commisslont s  view,  this  prlnciple  is  of
prime importance in  the present econonic circumstan-
ces.  In  its  application  to  the Commissionis  acti- vities  three main aspects emerge.tl
In  connection wlth  the third  aspect the Conmission
rrFinally,  equity  demands that  the  Commissionrs
competitlon policy  takes account of  the legitimate interests  of  workers, users and consumers.  These persons should be  allowed a  fair  share of  the
benefits  derlved  by  firms  from  agreements that restrlct  competition between themselves.  The saJne considerations,  particularly  the  deveLopment of employnent prospects, play  an  lmportant part  in the Commission's assessnent of  proposals for  State
aids.  I'
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the  role  of  competitlon  policy  in  contalning
have the followlng passage :
(16)
inflation
On
we36-
"c) Competltion  Pollcy
95.  Implementatlon  of  the  prograrnme  must  draw
on  an  actlve  competltion policy.  Such a  policy
can lmprove the  effectiveness of  the  lnstnrments
of  overall  demand managenent and  1n  particular
help  to  fight  inflatlon.  Its  obJectlve,  in  the
general lnterest,  must be :
-  to  obtaln as rat.ional as possible an allocation
of  the  {'actors  of  production,  in  particular
by exerting eonstant pressure on costs and prices;
-  to  promote contlnuous  adaptation of  the  produc-
tive  apparatus by encouragj.ng a rapid  re-alloca-
tion  of  labour and capital  towards those sectors
whlch have the greatest.future potential;
-  to  prevenl; firms  from using restrictive  or  abu-
slve  practlces  to  compartmentallze  and dominate
the market, or indeed manlpulate  demand.
96.  Action  aimed at  controlling  the  inflationary
effects  resulting  from  inadequate competitlon
in  the  pub1lc or  private  sectors must have three
objectlves :
-  lmproving  lnfomation  oD,  and  control  over,
dominant positlons,
-  promotlng the creation and maintenance of  profl-
table small- and medium-sized enterprises,
- more generally,  combatting all  artificial  ob-
stacles which dlstort  competition.  "
(Fourth  medium-tem economic policy  programne
(1926 -  1980) in  oJ No. L 1o1 of  2s,4.r927.-
Part  III,  polnt  B :  Progressive control  of  in-
flation)  .
(17) On  harmonlz,ation, particularly  wlth  regard  to
sald  in  reply  to  a  parliamen- nlght  work,  the  Comm:tssion
tary questlon :(18)
'rToo great  a  divergence  between national  legisla-
tions  could  lead  to  distortions  of  competltion.
In  exanlning the question of  night work the Commis-
sion  was concerned to  obviate  such distortion,
which could arise  should reforms presently  under
discusslon  at  na.tional  and  internatlonal  1eve1
(in  the  ILO context,  in  particular)  be  adopted
nithout  regard to  their  effects  on the condltions
of  competitlon.  "
(tfrltten  questlon No.  15/79 in  OJ No. C 2O5 of
L4.8.1979 :  "Community rules for night work'r).
'iThe fact  that  the  Member States'  social  security
systems are  flnanced in  different  ways doe6 not
in  ltself  cause a distortion  of comoetition.
A  problem can arise,  if  a  Menber State,  for  one
reason or  another,  amends its  financing  system
to  assist  a specific  branch of  industry,  for  exam-
p1e to maintain  employment.
It  is  then for  the Commission  to  determine  whether
there  1s a  dlstortion  of  competition and to  take
any steps requlred under the Treaty.
(wrltten  question No.  649/79 in  oJ  No. c 3o1 of
31.12.1979 :  "Distortions of competition").
(19)  "It  is  quite  correct  that  energy prices  vary  sub-
stantially  from one Member State to  another. For
example, at  the  end of  1979 the prlce  differentlaf
was around 3O96 for  petrol,  SOol for  domestic fuel,
and even higher for  gas and electricity.  The main
causes for  these  discrepancies are  as  follows
1. Signlficant  tax  differences between the various
Member States and between sources of energy;
2. Diverslty  ln  the  structures  of  the  energy ln-
dustry  and in  the  sources of  prlmary  energy
in  the dlfferent  llember States;
3. Price  control  systems which dlffer  i.rldely be-
tween the varlous countrles and between sources
of energy;( 20)
(2t)
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4. Differenoes  ln  the  policy  and  financing  of
European public energy-producing undertakings;
5. Slgniflcant  variations  in  productlvity,  labour
costs and energy requirements in  the  different
Community'countrles.
Such disparlties  could weIl  affect  the  condl-
tj.ons of  competition. For this  reason and also
because of  its  desire  to  further  its  common
energy policy  the  Commission attaches conslde-
rable  importance to  attaining  greater  market
transparency  and to  reduclng such dlsparlties
within tlre Communlty'r.
(Written  questlon No. 1708l79 j.n  0J  No. C 131
of  2.6. 1980 :  "Energy prices" ) .
'rFurthermore, the  establishment of  supply forecasts
for  a  reasc,nable period constitutes  a  stabilizlng
factor  with  regard to  the provision of  employment
which,  since  it  improves the  general  conditions
of  production,  especially  when market condltlons
are  unfavourable,  comes withln  the  frarnework  of
the objecti'ves to  which reference may be had pur-
suant to Art;icle 85(3)."
(Judgment of  the  Court of  Justice  of  25 October
1977 in  casre No. 26/76 -  Metro agalnst Commission
of  the  European  Communities  :  Reports of  Cases
before the Court of Justice 7977-6, page 1914).
"The requirenent contained in  Articles  3  and  85
of  the  EEC Treaty that  competition  shall  not  be
distorted  i,mp1les the  existence on  the  rnarket
of  workable competition, that  is  to  say the degree
of  competltlon necessary to  ensure the  observance
of  the  baslc  requirements  and the attainnent  of
the  obJectives of  the  Treaty,  in  particular  the
creation  of  a  slngle  market achieving conditions
slmllar  to those of a domestic market,
In  accordance wlth  this  requlrement the  nature
and intenalveness of  competitlon may vary  to  arr
extent  dictated  by  the  products or  senrices  1n
question and the economlc structure of  the relevant
market sectors.
(Judgment of  the  Court of  Justlce  L977-6  pages
1902-1903, see polnt 20).-39-
(22)  "However, although price competition is  so important
that  lt  can never be eliminated, it  does not  con-
stltute  the  only  effecti.ve  form  of  conpetition
or  that  to  vhich  absolute priority  must ln  all
clrcumstances be acconCed. rt
(Judgment of  the  Court of  Justlce  1977-6 '  Pag€
1903, see point  2O).
(23)  In  Case 730/79 of  17.9.80 the  court  of  Justlce
said among other things that  :
"The  Cornmission has  discretionary  powers whose
exercise  implies  economic  and  social  Judgments
that have to be made in  a Community context.rl
(Ca6e Philip  Morris/Commission)  .
(zq) In  1ts  Resolution on the Eighth Conmission Report
on Competition  Policy (OJ No. C 85 of 8.4.1980, the EP :
n2]-. Ur:ges the Commission to  seek the closest pos-
sible  coorrlination between the aims of  the various
common policles,  above aIl  between the  lndustrlal
pollcy  and  the  competitlon policy,  so  that  in
each sector  undergoing restructuring  the sofutions
chosen are  the least  expensive in  social  and bud-
getary  tenns and most sulted  to  re-establishing
competltlveness.  r'
(25) The Commisslon gave the  following  answer to  a
parllamentary  questlon :
rr1.  By  malntaining undlstorted  competition w'itLin:.
the  Community and thus  forcing  flrms  to  adapt
to  market conditions, competition  pollcy  stlmulates
conpetitlveness  and  efficlency  ln  firms.  Thls
must have a  favourable effect  on  firmsr  export
capaclty.-40-
The Comnisslon  has always taken care  to  ensure
that  its  competltlon policy,  which 1s not  vlewed
as  an  end in  itself,  operates in  harmony wlth
the  other  common policies.  However, the  one aim
of  improving  Community fi rms'  export  capacity
on the worl.d market would not be enough to  justlfy
practices  of  behaviour othervise  forbidden  by
the competibion rules laid  down in the Treaty."
(Written  questlon No. 71Ol79 in  OJ No.  C 316 of
17 .12.79 :  rrCompetition  Policy" ) .
(26)  In  its  Opinion on the  control  of  concentrations,
the  Economlc and Social  Committee  had the following  to  say
about coordlnation,  including  coordination within  the  Com-
misslon itself:
IIVI. NEED FOR COORDINATED  ACTION
The Commlttee  accepts that  the  baqic  crlterlon
for  accessing a concentration is  its  like1y  effect
on competition. However there are other  lmportant
factors  to  be  taken into  account. These incLude,
for  example, the commercial and regional lnterests
of  the  Communlty, the industriaS. lr{uerests of  dre
Odrinunity, rrotably .the effect  on sma1l  and medlqni
sized busirrcsses', and the social interests  of  the
Comnunity, notably the impaci on eniployment  and  'r;he.
:rights of . worke::s. The necessa?y ,coniiultatlon  on
these matter.s  should be cannied out.
Consequently, the  Committee  wishes to  stress  the
need for  plose  liaison  and consultatlon  between
the several Dlrectorates of  the Conmission whenever
a  concentration  1s  examined under the  tems  of
this  Regulaliion.rl
(0pinlon  o:f  the  Economic and  Social  Committee
on  the  Draft  Councll Regulation on  the  control
of  concentratlons :  point  VI  -  I'Need for  coordl-
nated actionil,  1n OJ No. C 88 of  26.7.L974).-41  -
rv. ulxED ECONoMY -  FULL rNF0B!{4i!!9t{__:  ArDS
(27)  In  1ts  Resolution on the Eighth Conmlsslon Report
on Competition Pollcy,  the EP :
"16.  Has noted the  Commissionrs  general guidelines
for  a  Dlrective  on the  transparency  of  financlal
relatlons  between Member States and publlc  under-
taklngs; reafflrms  in  this  regard its  determlnatlon
that,  whilst  saf,eguardlng the  efficiency  of  the
speclal  functions  with  which they  are  entmsted
there should be an attenpt to  achieve fu11 equality
of  conditions of  competitlon  between private  and
public  undertakings operating in  the  competition
sector. "
(o.l r.to. c BS of 8.4.1980).
( 28)
parency
publ l.c
Commission Dlrectlve  of  25 June 1980 on the trans-
of  financlal  relations  between  Member States  and
undertaklngs (OJ No. L 195 of  29.7.1980).
( 29)  The  Commlssion had  already  clearly  enunciated
the principles  underlylng  the above Dj-rective,  stating  among
other things that  :
"The undeniable llberty  of  a Member State to  choose
the  system of  property ownership it  prefers  does
not  diminish  its  responsibility  to  ensure that
both  1ts  administration of  the  publ1c sector  and
the  market behaviour of  its  public  under'takings
are  in  accordance with  Treaty ru1es.  lt  follows
that  the  economlc and financial  operating condi-
tions  of  publlc  undertakings . provlding  goods or
servlces in  a  cornpetitive sltuatj-on in  the  common
market,  mugt 1n  principle  be  detemlned by  the
free  interplay  of  the  factors  of  productlon. The
flnanclal  equlLibrium of  these  undertakings  as
well  as the remuneration  of  their  operatlng capltal
should therefore notmally be based upon the revenue
resultlng  from  their  industrlal  and  commercial
actlvities.  To have recourse to  other  means than
these  revenues and  the  credlt  facllitles  whlch
go with  them le  to  rlsk  distortlng  the condltlone
of  competltion, and may come under the rules  con-
cernlng  State  a1ds. . That  ls  vthy Ereater  trans-
parency ln  thts  fleld  18 essentlal.'l-42-
(Efghth  Commlsslon Report on  Competltlon policy
(1978) Chapter III  :  'rPubllc flrms,' -  No. 254).
(30)  The Commlsslon  1s  exceedingly cautlous and even
somewhat at a loss ln  thls  respect :
(Sf1  The Economlc 6g16 Soctal Comrnittee haal the followlng
to  say ln  1tB Oplnlon on the  Report on Certain Stnrctural
Aepects of Growth :
rrThe Commlsslon would point  out  that  only  for  very
good reasons does lt  depart from lts  general policy
of  not  publlshing general frameworkJ setting  out levels  and types of  assistance  which may be gran-
ted.  If  such frameworks became too  common. this could  well  be  interpreted  as  an  encouragenent of  State  alds,  contrary  to  the  baslc  philosophy
of  the  Treaty.  However, when 1t  is  clear  that an industry  is  or  is  likely  to  be ln  particular
difflculty  throughout the Connunity, certaln princl- ples  can be  deflned  to  explain  the  Community's pollcy  on ald  which might be granted to  overcome the  problems of  the  industry  concerned. policy
frameworks have therefore  been produced on State alds for  reglonal development, shipbuildlng,  steel., textiles  and environment.  The Commission  is  con_ slderlng  that  advantages  and disadvantages  inherent ln  frameworks for  State  ald  to  employment and research and . development. State  aid  for  small_ and  medium-sized enterprises  ls  already  viewed ln  a favourable light  pursuant to  the Commisslonrs general policy.  Rescue cases are subJect to j.ndi.vi_
dual analysLs.  The Conmisslon,s poliCy and activity 1n the  fleld  of  State alds,  of  whlch the pointl ralsed  above are but  a  snall  part,  are  described ln  deta11 ln  the  Annual Report on  Competition
Po11cy sent to the Parllament.'r
(Rep1y of  Commlssloner  VOUEL to  wrltten  question
No. I69g/j9  rGeneraL aid  schemesf  in  OJ No-. C 160 of  30.6.1980).
V. BUSINESS  PRACTTCES
rr2.4.3.3. As regarda potlcles  to  stlmulate  lnnova_ tlon  by  smalI buslness, all  lndustriallzed  coun_ trlea  -nos 1g9ep! that  the pubtlc authorttles  ought to  help  wlth  tralnl.ng  of  research workers,  to-43-
encouraSe and  support  innovattve  entrepreneurs,
to  stimulate  research  ( technological  research)
by  direct  flnance  and public  contracts,  and to
encourage collaboration  between big  and  sma11
buslnesses so  as  to  make for  the  dlsseminatlon
of  innovations throughout the  public  and private
sectors.  Fron  the  institutional  point  of  view,
the  relevant  publj-c regulations  must provide  the
innovating  entrepreneur with  a  reliable  frame
of reference vrhich minimizes non-market risks."
(O.l tto. C 146 of  16.6.1980).
(32)  Draft  Commission Regulation orl  the  Application
of  Article  85.3 of  the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent
Licensing Agreements (0J No. C 58 of  3.3.1979).
(33)  Judgment of  the  Court of  Justice  of  25 October
L97? in  Case No. 26/76, Metro versus Commission  of  the Euro-
pean Communities  :
'r...  In  the sector covering the production of  high
quality  and technica]ly advanced consuner durabfes,
where a  relatlvely  small  number of  large-  and
medium-sca1e  producers offer  a  varled  range of
items  whlch,  or  so  consumers may consider,  are
readi.ly  interchangeabLe,  the  structure  of  the
market does not preclude the existence of a variety
of  channefs of  distrlbution  adapted to  the pecullar
characteristics  of  the  various  producers and to
the  requlrement of  the various categories of  con-
sumers.
On this  view the Commission  was justified  in  recog-
nizing  that  selective  distribution  systems consti-
tuted,  together rriith others,  an aspect of  competi-
tlon  whlch  accords wlth  Article  85(1),  provided
that  re-sellers  are chosen on the basis of  obJec-
tlve  criterla  of  a  qualltatlve  nature  relatlng
to  the  technical  qualiflcations  of  the  re-se11er
and his  staff  and the  suitability  of  his  trading
premises and that  such condltions are  laid  down
unlformly  for  all  potentlal  re-sel1ers  and  are
not applied in  a dlscrimlnatory  fashion.r'
(Reports on the Cases before the Court of  Justice
of the EP -  1976-6 -  page 1903).-44-
(34)  Draft  Resolutlon  of  the  European Parllanent's
Economlc and Monetary  . Committee  on the  'rEuropean automoblle
lndustryil (December 19SO).
rrThe European  Parllarnent . ..
15.  Urgently calls  for  an end to  be put  to  the fragmentation of  the  Community industries,  by the  adoption of  measures  ained  at  encoufaglng
fuller  cooperation between companies through jolni
programmes covering  research,  experlmentatlon
and components and motor vehicle  productlon  as vrell  as  other  forms of  collaboration  and Joint ventures urithln the Community and with  undertaklngs
in  thlrd  countries,  such as  would help  lmprove
European  productlon and  deserve to  be  approved and supported. Whlle concentration may also  have their  drawbacks,  they  should pos5.tlvely be  en-
couraged ln  sultable cases (for  example, in  centatn sectors  of  the  components lndustry),  when the result  would be  substantial  economies of  scal.e and  a  better  organization  of  the  production
process.,'
(3s ) Reply of
2tO/78 ln  OJ No. C
tration  operatlonst'  :
the  Commlssion to  written  question No.
:192 of  1O.8.1978 on "Trends in  concen-
"1.  Agalnst  the  current  background of  economic crlsls  and changes 1n the  internatl.onal  dlvision of  Labour, hlgher productivity  rates and lncreased
competlti.veness  1n  the  Community economies can only  be  ensured if  the  stnlcture  of  industrles and flrms  is  adJusted as required.  In  some cases the  necessary  changes may involve  an  lncrease in merger actlvity.  ff  this  brings about an improve_ ment in  the  efficiency  and international  competl_ tlveneas of  the  flrms  concerned,  the  Comnission wlll  take a sympathetic view.4s-
2.  Nevertheless, slnce competition might be adver-
sely  affected,  the  Cornmunity must have at  1ts
disposal the necessary means of  determining whether
a  merger w111 prevent effective  competition,  as
stated  1n the  fourth  medlum-term economic policy
prograJnme.  In  this  connection,  the  Commission
would hope that  the  Council will  shortly  adopt
the proposal for  a meiger control  Regulation which
the Commission presented to  it  in  1973. The fourth
programme also  stresses  the  need to  set  uF,  at
national  1eve1s the  necessary legal  instn:ments
by  lnstltuting  laws  in  areas where none exist
or  by extending the fleld  of  appllcation of  exis-
ting  1aws. This obJecttve is  still  valid  today."
( 36) Opinion of  the  Economic and Social  Committee on
of  Concentratlons the  Council  Regulation on  the  Control
(28.2,1974) in  OJ No. C 88 of  26.7.1974:
'IGENERAL COMMENTS
I.  Baslc princlples
The Committee accepts that  it  is  necessary for
the  Community to  control  certain  concentrationa
of  enterprises  in  order to  preserve the competltive
system with  the  benefits  it  brings  in  efficlency
and ln  freedom of  choice. At the tlme the Commlttee
recognizes that,  in  some cases concentration  may
bring  substantial" benefits  through economies  of
scale and by ratlonalizatlon  which it  may be necea-
sary to  achleve in  order to  make European indus-
trles  competitlve with  those in  other maior indus-
trialized  countries.  The problem of  controlllng
concentration  must  therefore  be  approached on
a  "case-by-easerr basis within  a franework of  gene-
ra1  principles  and having regard to  the  economlc
and soclal provislons of the Treaty.r'
(37)  In  a  reply  to  questions,  the  conmission  surnmed
up the situatlon  in  November 1979 as follows  :-46-
"It  has so far  proved lmpossible to  reach agreement
wlth  the  Councll on the proposa] for  a Regulatlon
on control of concentratlon  submitted by the Commls-
slon  on account of  the  reservations on a  number
of  baslc  features  whlch are  fundamental to  the
very fabrlc  of  the Regulation.
The first  problem is  recourse to  preventlve control
of  concentratlons,  which glves rise  to  the  point
whether a  Regulatlon providing  for  such control
can be based on Articles  87 and 235 of  the lreaty.
Furthermore,  1t  has  been inpossible  to  define
with  accuracy the  scope of  the  Regulatlon either
as regards determining sectors liable  for  exemptlon
or  establishlng  thresholds in  terms of  turnover
or  market share to  be used as a basls in  applying
the Community ruIes.  One further  outstandlng lssue
ts  the definitlon  of  the condltions for  the smooth
application  of  parallel  Community and  natlonal
control of  ooncentratlons.
Similarly,  bhe condttions  for  securing conslstency
between lndustrlal,  social  and regional . pollcies
and whatever decisions might be taken at  Community
level  for  the  control  of  concentrations stl1l
need to  be  defined.  Fina1ly,  there  remains the
unsolved isaue of  the confemal of  decislon-making
povrers under the proJected regulations.
As these baslc points  are stiIl  under dlscussion,
the  provisions  for  the  control  of  concentrations
called  for  'by the Heads of  State or  of  Government
ln  t972  ca,nnot at  thls  juncture  be  adopted in
the  form of  a  Councll Regulatlon, However, the
Commission proposaL remains before  the  Councll,
whlch has not  abandoned  the  quest  for  possible
agreenent orn the  Regulation, thereby meeting the
wishes of the Heads of State or Government."
(Written  questlon No.  225/79 1n OJ No. C 282 of
12.11.1979 :  'rControl of Concentrationsrr).-47-
(38)  Proposal for  Fifth  Directive  on
Structures  of  Lj.mited Liabillty  Companies
of  13. 12.I972).
the  Management
(OJ No.  C 131
(39)  Amended proposal for  a  Seventh Directive  on Group
Accounts (O.l lto. c 14 of L7.t.\979).
(4O)  The Sixth  and Seventh Progress Report of  the Busl-
ness  Cooperation Centre (coM(80) 448 fin  of  12.8.1980
page 9) also favours this  trend :
"3.2.  The European  Cooperation Grouping
The palnful  gestation  of  thls  Community legal
instrument  seems sometlnes to  raise  doubts about
its  usefulness or necessity.
It  is  true  that  quite  rightly,  the 1egal obstacles
to  transnational  cooperation  no  longer  have the
prohibitive  importance that  was  attributed  to
them during the first  decade of  the Common Marketrs
exlstence.  It  is  also true  that  a Conmunlty Statute
is  not  necessarily intrinsically  superior or  more
effective.
However, the  EEC can bear  witness  to  the  fact
that  the  psychological importance  of  making  use
of  a  Community Statute  wlll  often  be declsive :
slnce  smal] and medium-slzed  enterprises are  in-
volved,  the  fact  of  having to  choose a  natlonal
1egal structure  automatically  places one of  the
partners on unfamlliar  ground, which he dlstrusts,
and the  BCC has seen several  groupings fal1  for
want of  an ECG that  could have put  all  partners
on the same footing.
The  future  member countrles  have also  already
expressdd their  interest  in  the existence of  such
a Etatute.'l-48-
(41 ) Judgment ofl  the  Court of  Justice  of  13.2.1979
in  Case No.  85/76,  HOFFI,IANN -  ta  Roche versu8 Comrnlsslon
of the European  Communitles -  Maxlm No. 1 :
"Observance of  the  rlght  to  be  heard ls,  ln  all proceedings 1n which sanctionq in  particular  flnes or  penalty payments, must be inposed, a ftrndamental principle  of  Communlty 1aw, which must be respected
even lf  the proceedings  in  questlon are admlnistra_ tive  proceedlngs.
In  the  matber of  competition and in  the  context of  proce,edlngs for  a  finding  of  infrlngements of  Articles  85  or  86  of  the  Treaty,  obsenrance of  the right  to  be heard requires that  the  under_ takings  concerned must have been afforded  the opportunlty to  make known thelr  views on the truth and relevance of  the  facts  and clrcumstances al_ Ieged and on the documents used by the Commlsslon in  support of  lts  claim  that  thCre has been an infringement.  "
(Report on the  Cases before the Court of  Justlce t979-2 -  page 462).
(42) EP Resolution
on Competltion Policy ln
on  the  Eighth  Commisslon Report
OJ No. C 85 of 8.4.1990.
rrThe European  parllament  .....
20.  Conslder.s in  general that  the procedures fol_ lovred for  enforcement  of  the rules  on cornpetltlon lald  down ln  the  Treaties  needs clarificatlon and ampliflcatlon  so  that  it  wlll  work  fairly for  the  partles  and others  concerned; consldersl furthermore,  that  the  procedure i.n quistlon  often seems extremely slow and asks the  Commlsslon  ro seek a  swift-er approach wlthout irhich competltlon pollcy  w111 lose.much of  its  credlbility  an-d effec- tlveness and requests the  Cornmisslon  in  its  nexr annual report  to  make concrete proposals for  a slmpllfied- procedure.'l
(43)  "brhereas unfalr  and mlsreadtng aclvertislng 1s lrkery to restrlct  the establlshrnent  of  a systei  to ensure that  competltlon ie  not dlstorted l,iahtn the common market.rt(44)
49-
(Second recltal  of  the  Proposal for  a  Councll
Dlrective on the Approxlmation  of  the Laws' Regula-
tions  and Adminlstrative Provislons of  the  Member
States concernlng  Misleading and Unfalr Advertising
( o.l wo. c 7o of  21 . 3.1978  ) .
"This  summary  of'  aspects of  competition pollcy
within  the Community would not be complete vtithout
a  reference to  the  important recent  developments
in  natlonal  competition legislatlon  in  nost Member
States,  and  the  renewed vigour  with  whlch  the
law has been applled.  In  each case, the  national
Ieglslation  has  been brought more and more lnto
line  with  the Community  ru1es, and the theoretical
danger of  conflict  between national  Iavr and Com-
munity law has been reduced accordingly -  ln  fact
the  energetic  and  fruitful  cooperation between
the approprlate  natlonal authorities  and the Commls-
slon  has  practically  eliminated  the  danger of
such conflicts.  It  would be fair  to  say that  the
practical  impllcations  of  the  Communityts actlve
competition p01lcy  have done much to  encourage
progress at  nationaL level.  The means of  mai.n-
taining  effective  conpetition  throughout the  Com-
munity have therefore  been appreciably strengthe-
ned,  thanks to  the  improved consistency  between
the  various  bodies of  law  and the  way 1n whlch
national  and  Community pollcies  have  converged
on slmllar  obJectlves.
One of  the  side-effects  of  these recent  changes
in  ndtional  Legislation  has  been to  highllght
situations  existing  at  national  fevel  where 1t
may be  necessany  to  reconcile  an  acknowLedged
adherence to  the  principle  of  competltlon wlth
industrlal,  social  or  regional policy  obJectives.
The . sane problens may arise  at  European 1evel.
Each case must be  considered  on  its  own merits.
This  applies,  for  exanple,  to  the  difflculties
currently  facing  Europets man-made  fibres  lndustry
and lron  and steel lndustry.r'
(etgntn  Commisslon Report on  Competltion Pol1cy
-  Introductlon, page 13).-50-
VT. CONSUMEN  PROTECTION
(as)  "1.
The Commisslonts  constant policy  has been to  con-
demn restrictive  or  unfair  pricing  practlsed  by
flrms  in  colluslon  or  by  domlnant flrms;  and to
impose fines  on offenders. However, it  must stress
that  it  would be  totally  unreralistic  to  assume
that  prlces  could be uniform throughout the common
narket particularly  in  the case of  non-homogeneous products, not  onfy  because the  obJectlve factora
detemlnlng priclng  policy  vary  from firm  to  firm
but also because normal competltion  does not neces-
sarily  make for  i:niform prices.
(46)
(Except from  the  Commissionrs reply  to  written questlon No. L94/79 1n OJ No. C Zt4 of  Zj.B.lgZg.
'rProtection  of  consumers against  misleadlng
prlcestt) .
t,2.
The dlfferences  in  national legislatlon,  VAT rates, taxatlon,  wage costs and social  security  contrlbu- tlons,  together  wlth  the  differences  1n  trade forms  and  patterns,  and  consumer hablts,  make it  dlfflcult  to  carry  out a rneanlngful comparlson of  prlces  j.n the various Member States,  even for identlcal  pr.oducts.
(Excerpt from the  Commissionrs  reply  to  the  ques-
tlon  referreld to in point 45).
(47)  fn  answer to  a parliamentary question Conmissloner
VOUEL began by saylng that  :
rrProtecting  the  lnterests  of  the  consumer always has been one of  the maln obJectlves of  competltlon pollcyrr.
(Wrltten  question No.  494/BO 1n OJ No. C 198 of
4.8.1980)  .-51  -
(48)
(4e)
(so)
'rIt  rould  be unforgivable  not  to  se12e the  oppor-
iutitf'1o-  ta"t  y5u  to  steer  clear  of  the  ldea
that  there  can Ue a  uniform prlce  ln  the  Comnon
tfarket,  i.e.  a  rrEuropean" pricer.  even lf  Buch
an ldei  ls  frequentty voiced ln Parliament'
Differences 1n production and dlstrlbutlon  costs
are usually,  and- naturally,  reflected  in  dlfferent
selling  p"tces  thowh  dif fering  prlces  .?re alao
an imp-oriant factor  per se and indlcate  the exis-
tence of  effectlve  competitlon.  The alm of  the
Commisslon is  not  theiefore  to  control  prlces
but  to  elimlnate  unfair  discriminatlon  by  firms'
which,  because of  thelr  posltlon,  are  able  to
domlnate  the market."
(Excerpt from the  lntroductory  speech - of 
-Commls- sioner  VOUEL on  the  work - of  the  EP's  Economlc
and !{onetary Commlttee on  the  Elghth  Report on
Competltion  Po11cY).
VII.  CONDITIONS FOR THE DiVELOPMENT  OF A,COIi{PETITION  POLICY
"2.2.2.  Demand from the industrialized  countrles
2.2.2.1.  As  far  as  economlc relations  with  the
other  lndustrlaltzed  countrles  ar€  concerned'
the  Comnittee stresses  that  the  Community  must
be vigllant  ln  maklng sure that  the rules of  compe-
tltioi  are observed and in  fostering  the devefop-
ment of balanced commercial  relations: "
(oplnlon  of  the  Economic and  Soclal  Commlttee
on  the  Report on  Certaln  Stmctural  Aspects of
Grobrth ln  oJ No. C 146 of  16.6.1980).
"The Commlsslon partlcipates  1n  the  OECDTs  work
on monltoring restrictlve  tradlng practlces.  Coope-
ration  here lls  on  a  multilateral  Ievel,  but  the
Commlsslon  also  has  regular  bilateral  contacts
with  the  approprlate natlonal  authorlties  ln  the
Unlted States  and Canada, and occaslonally wlth
the  authorltles  1n  other  non-member  countrles.
In  this  context  1t  should be borie  1n mlnd that
the baslc rules  contalned ln  the free-trade agree-
ments between the  Conmr.rnlty and the EF?A countrlea
to  malntaln  efficient  tradlng  relatlons  between
the  Comnunity and each of  the signatory countrlea
are  verlr  slmilar  to  the  prlnciples  on which the
rules of competltlon  in  the EEC Treaty are based.-52-
( 51)
The Unlted Natlons Conference  on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD)  is  currently  the  scene of  prepara-
tlons  for  an lmportant step towar.'s a new .econonlc
world  order.  Once the  aim of  redefining  lnter-
national  economlc relations  has  been  achieved
a  set  of  universally  recognised rules  governlng
fair  conduct will  have to be brought into  effect.tr
(flgntn  commlssion Report on  Competitlon Pollcy
-  Introductlon, page 14).
"16.  We have found that  there  is  a  certain  lack
of  coheslon in  the  college  of  Commissloners,  an
imbalance between portfollos,  insufficient  coordina-
tion  among senlor  officials,  a  maldistribution
of  staff  between departments, and  shortcomings
in  the  career structure  of  the  civil  service of
the  Commlssion. The fact  is  that  the  Commisslon
is  belng managed tn  a  manner and with  techniques
which are  rlnappropriate in  present circwnstances
and can only be more so after  further  enlargement.rl
(Proposals for  reform of  the  Commission  of  the
European Communitles and  its  departments
"SPIERENBURG Report" -  24.9.1979 -  page 5).
(52)  "The European Parliament .....
20. CaIIs on both the  Commission and the  Council
to  overrlde  admlnistrative  compartmentallzation
or  habitual  procedures in  order  to  give  greater
consistency to  the various activitie$  which should,
directly  or  lndirectly,  contribute to  the effective
implementatlon of  competition policy  and to  its
credlbility.  "
(EP Resolution  on  the  Seventh Commi.sslon  Reporr
on Competition  Po1icy -  OJ No. C 261 of 6.11.1978).
(53) Some of
pean Instltutions
Mbn to the European
the statenents in
presented by  the
, councll (october
the Report on the Euro-
Committee  of  Three Wlse
1979) are slgnificant.-3J-
Since the  enlargement  of  the  Commlsslon ln  1967,
there has been a loss  of  colleglality  ln  lts  nem-
bersr  method of  working, combined with  lnadequate
lnternal  coor.dination.
In  its  organization generally,  there  1s  a  lack
of  collegiate  management and no collective  pollcy
approach . . .'r.
(Page 66 of the Report).-55-
B.  REPORT
on
Cornmunity Competition  in  the Light of
the Current Economic  and Social Situatlon
Rapporteur  : Mr BAGLIANO
Co-Rapporteur i  Mr NEUMANN-56-
This Report sets out ilembersr conments  on the various chapters
of the Oplnion.
The comments should therefore be read in  the  light  of  the
relevant  passages of  the  Opinion -  passage6  whtch are  not
reproduced  here for  reaaons of  space.
N.B, :(The numbers ln  brackets refer  to  the appendlx to  the
Oplnlon, whlch comprlses quotatlons whlch may help to
elucldate the problems dlscussed ln  this  Report).-57-
PRELIMINARY  REMARKS
On 4 July  1979, the Section for  Industry, Conmerce,
Crafts  and  Servi.ces  was  addressed by  Mr SCHLIEDER,
Director-General at  the Conrnission, on the Elghth Report on
Competition Pollcy.
After  a wide-ranging and thorough discusslon  of  the
matter, the Section decided to  ask the Committeers Bureau for
authorization  to  dellver  an  own-initiative  Oplnion  on
Community Competltion Policy  in  the  light  of  the  Current
Economlc  and Soclal Situatlon.
At the July Plenary Session the sane year the Bureau
and the Plenary Commlttee approved this  request. 0n 3 October
1979 a Study Group chaired by Mr LAVAL, with Mr BAGLIANO and
Mr NEUMANN as Rapporteur and Co-Rapporteur, was set up to pre-
pare the Draft Oplnion and Draft Report.
SHORT  EXPLANATION  OF RULES  ON COI!{PETITION
Rules on  competition policy  are  dealt  with  ln
Articles  60, 65 and 66 of  the ECSC Treaty as well  as Articles
85 to  90 (rules  appJ.ying to  flrms)  and Article  92 et  seg.
(aids granted by States) of the EEC Treaty.
Under the  Treaty  of  Paris,  the  Commlssion is
entitled,  under certaln  condltions,  to  flx  production quotas
and programmes as well  as maxlmum and minimum prlces for  coal
and lron  and steel  products. The treaty  of  Rome whlch deals
with the European  Economlc Comnunity, does not have provlslons
of this  sort.-58-
the  provls:lons of  the  tv{o Treatles  also  dlffer
signlficantly  on the subJect of  mergers. The Treaty of  Parls
provldes for  prlor  merger control whereas the Treaty of  Rome
merely bans abuse of rloninant positlon  (Artlc1e 86).
In partlcular,  Regulation l?/62 and the Implementtng
Regulatlons  thereto  provide  the  Commlsslon wlth  the
lnstnrments  1t  needs  to  adminlster  implementation  of
Artlcles  85 and 86 of  the Treaty of  Rome. These conslst of
negatlve  clearance and declslons on  exemption and abuse.
Negatlve clearance means that  the  Commlssion flnds  that  Ern
agreement does not warrant actlon,  in  accordance wlth ArtlcLe
85(1)  and Artj.cle 86.  Declslons in  tnappllcabillty  1ead to
temporary derogations belng granted in  the case of  agreements
between undertaklngsn  declslons by  assoclatlons of  under-
taklngs and concerted  practlces complying with Article  gS(3).
When decidlng that  abuse exlsts,  the Commlsslon may ask firms
to  deslst  from the abuslve practices concerned and may even
lnnpose flnes.  Slnce  Regulatlon 17162 provides  for  the
notlflcatlon  of  agreenents  or  concerted  practlces  comlng
withln  the scope of Articles  85 and 86 of  the Treaty of  Rome
and many such notlflcations  lrere received, lt  became necessary
to  lntroduce regulatlons  exemptlng speciflc  categorles of
agreements.
Regulatlon 67/67 and Regulatlon Z9O3/72 on excluslve
deallng  and  speclallzatlon  agreements respectlvely,  were
therefore adopted and a Regulatlon on exemptlons for  certaln
categorlea of patent l.lcence agreements is  pendlng.
LaatIy,  the Commlsslon lssues ,'communicationsr, con-
cernlng the lnterpretatlon of Article  85(1) of  the Treaty.-59-
Public aid  to  firms  (Artlcle  9A et  seq. )  is  lncom-
patible  with  the  common market insofar  as it  affects  trade
between Member States by dlstorting  or  threatening to dlstort
competition.
Acceptable, however, is  regional or sectoral aid to
renedy reglonal  imbalances  or  facilitate  the development  of
certaln economic actlvitles.
In  implementation of  the rules  of  competition,  the
Commisslon  has adopted more than 15O individual  decisions af-
fectlng firms whilst  the Court of Justice has issued more than
6O judgments (rullng  on appeal.s by firms or foll.owing  requesrs
by national courts for  a preliminary  ruling  on points relatlng
to the j.nterpretation  of Article  85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty).
This constitutes a substantial and steadily  expanding body of
case lavr.
COMMENTS BY THE SECTION
I.  COMPETITION  POLICY IN AN ''OPEN''  MARKET IN THE PROCESS  OF
INTEGRATION
The present economic and social  situation  justlfles
special  attention  being paid  to  the  implementation of  the
rules  of  competitlon.  The  latter  are.,  after  all,  an
" instrumenttr for  achieving  the  obJectives of  the  Treaty of
Rone (1).  A dogmatic (13) or  theoretical  approach should  be
avolded and competition pollcy  should be considered from the
polnt  of  view of  the Communityrs ovenall aetivities  (Z)  (g)
wh1ch, in  turn,  need to  be seen in  the wider world context
(4).-60-
lde shal1 start  by describing some of  the baslc fea-
tures of competition  lin a market economy and by presentlng  va-
rlous lnformatlon models.
In  our competition and information  models' the key
sectors  of  the  economy are  organlzed according to  the
princlples  of  the market economy. Thls means that  suppliers
compete with one another. A realistic  model, however, does not
mean "perfect",  honogenous competitlon -  a  concept stl11
taught in  parts  of  neo-classlcal theory using an analytlcal
model. Our rrrealistic  model of  competitionr' 1s roughly as
follows  :
-  there exist  not only markets where there are many suppliers
(po.Lypolistlc  and atornistic competition)  but  also  markets
whe:re there are few suppllers (oligopolistic  competj.tlon);
competltlon between suppllers ls  not limited  to  prlces but
lncludes other  factors  (parameters) such aE condltlons of
sale, advertlslng, etc.);
cornpetltion  affects  not only reasonably homogenous, compa-
rable  goods but also concerns the possibllity  of  spendlng
lncomes ln  a wide varlety  of  ways, for  example on holldays
as opposed to buyi.ng a new car (substitution  competitlon);
There are very many' different  types and sizes of  flrms pur-
sulng dlfferent  econqnlc  obJectlves  (not only bent solely  on
proflt-maklng); this  obvlates any risk  of  standarrClzation  of
the  economy vl.a  wholesale nationalization  cir  wholesafe
denatlonal izatlon;-61  -
Market-economy processes do not operate ln  a vacuutn and do
not  end up by  ,'spontaneously" regulating  the market, as
traditlonal  liberal  economic thinklng  would have it;  they
are ln  fact  "steered" (overall  control  of economic sectorsr
actlvitles)  by a vast array of  economic policy  instnrments
(cycI1cal, reflationary  and monetary pollcies) ;
There is  no consuner soverelgnty as there would be if  consu-
mers' decislons  1ed to an I'optimum productlon  structuren;
Consumer freedon is  protected in  princlple  (free  cholce of
consumers)  though this  does not rule  out the possibillty  of
consumer choice  belng  restrlcted;  al.ternative  ways of
ut111zing  oner s  income cannot,  however, be  completely
blocked by restrictions;
The autonomy of the varlous parties involved is  in prlnciple
guaranteed, whlch means that  all  1egal rel-atlons are freely
negotlated b€tween the  contractlng  partles  (princlple  of
freedom of  contract);
The State guarantees free competitlon  and punishes infringe-
ments of  ruleg  of  corrpetition;  it  does thls  by flghtlng
against the  least  deslrable and least  tolerable  foms  of
dlstortion  (for  example dlscrimlnation, prlce-fixlng);
The lncome effects  of  a distrlbution  of  the  economic  cake
(the  household distributlon  Of incomes) are I'corrected'r by
redistrlbution  imposecl by  the  authorltles  (taxes,  soclal
securlty contributlons) .-62-
From the point  of  view of  the consumer, the maln
effecbs of this  rough competition model are as follows  :
Consumers are adequately supplied wlth  goods at  acceptable
prlces fron a distrlbution-policy  point of  view; thls  means
that  "institutlonalized'r  competitlon should not becone too
expensive;
-  Competltlon  fulfl1s  a power-allocating  role which favourably
affects the posltlon of  consumers;
-  Competition gives consumers  sufficient  choice.
Closely llrrked to  though covering more ground than
the  conpetltlon  model is  the  informatlon modeI. Such €rn
informatlon model can be a frame of reference for  competltion
po1lcy. One of the most important hypotheses  propounded  by the
competition model in  polnt  of  fact  is  that  economlc  agents
behave ratlonally  (i.e.  a1l economic agents strive  to increase
thelr  proflts  -  I'personal profits  axiom"), which in  turn
presupposes  that  consumers are  fed  with  sufflclent
information.
The lnfonnation rnodel assumes that  consumers can
only  properl"y fulfi1.  their  role  as economic agents 1n the
economlc process lf  they are provided with sufficient  lnforma-
tion  to  enable them to  make their  buying declsions.  Thls
lmplCes a detailed understanding of how the economy functions,
p!.us up-to-date lnfomatlon.  Informatlon of  course should not-63-
coe€ solely  from the  supply side :  there should also be a
syster  of  counter-informati.on, or  at  least  neutral  lnfor-
matlon, uhlch would countettalance, for  example, one-sided or
misieadlng  advertising.  Once  in  possession  of  such
infomation,  consumers would -  with  this  information model -
be 1n a position to  take rational  decisions.
Crlticism  of  this  abstract  informatlon model from
the point  of  view of  consumer po1lcy (consumer policy  taking
its  cue  from  the  information  model) boils  down to  the
following three problems  :
-  lnfotmation  on lts  own cannot give consumers the knowledge
they are looklng for;
-  infonnatlon ls  not properly taken in by a high proportion of
conguners because consumers do not  (or  do not  wish  to)
behave rationafly;
-  lnformatlon  ls  used as  a  pretext  for  not  taktng
necessary  measures to protect consumers.
Although thls  can be a useful  frame of  reference,
many members conslder that a pragmatic  and undogmatlc  approach
to the problem of  competition is  more approprlate.
bhe-64-
The  Commlsslon in  fact -  as  the  Conmisslon
representative  sald  when discusslng the matter -  has always
affirmed that rules of' competitlon are applied in  a undogmatlc
spirlt  both from the purely economlc view and from the polnt
of  view of  political  philosophy. Implenentation of  the lega1
rules  on non cut-throat  competition is  pragmatlc, realistlc
and designed to  be  effective.  It  cannot merely be  the
reflection  of a temporarily dominant theoretical concept. Such
a  concept wou1d, 1n any case, not necessarily  be shared by
public opinlon ln  aII  the Member States.
Some members  polnt  out  that  rules  of  competition
have an important  role  to play in achleving the cornmon  market
thowh they are not one of  therrinstrumentsr for  doing so.
As long as there are still  a great many disparltles
between the  economles of  the  Member States,  integratlon
through appl-ication of  rules  of  competltlon would harm
Comnunity  industry and the general interests of the Communlty.
The  same members consider  that  the  sporadlc
implementatlon  of  Art:icles BS and 86 is  not likely  to  reduce
existlng economlc dlsparities  between Member States.
Some members  note that,  applying exclusively  legal
criteria,  the Conmlsslon 1n some cases sees competition policy
as  an  end ln  itself'and  has even taken this  view quite
recently.-65-
Other members, in the belief  that competitlon poIlcy
is  not  an  end 1n 1tse1f  b.ut rnust address itself  to  the
economic and industrial  reality  of  the  Community,  malntaln
that  competitj.on policy  must take into  account the need for
EEC industry to be able to conpete effectively  both wj-thin and
outslde  the  Communlty against foreign  competitors, some of
whom come from countries hrhere "competition" has littIe  or no
meaning or  where  the  conpetitive  conditlons  are  very
different.  fn  practi"cal terms, this  means that  these factors
must be taken into  account in  evaluatj-ng for  example proposals
for  Joint ventures, specialisation and cooperation agreements
and the  tike.  Converselj, the  rules  of  competitlon must be
applied to  every enterprise operating within  the EEC, either
directLy  or  through a controLled  subsidiary or other agents,
regardless of  whether the  firm  is  |Communityrrorrrforeignrl
owned or established.
Lastly,  some members point  out  that  competltion
poficy  is  essential to  the proper functioning of the economic
system and in  this  respect is  unique and dlfferent  from all
other Community  policies.
II.  INTERDEPENDENCE  AND ITS EFFECTS  _ COMMUNITY  COMPETI-
TIVENESS RELEVANT MARKET
The Community is  'ropen'r to international  competition
and must therefore be able to  compete with other areas of  the
world (s)  (6)  (8)  (e)  (10).-66-
In  deflnlng  a  "substantial  part  of  the  market"
account must be taken of  this  overall  approach (11) (12).
rrCooperatio,n't, however, 1s necessalXr not  only  be-
tween flrms but also between  lilember States and thlrd  countries
-  partlcularly  developing  ones and particularly  ln  the context
of a new lnternatlonal  dlvision of  labour (7).
Some members point out that in  encouraging an 'ropen"
market the free  movement of  goods between the EEC and other
countnles can sometlmes act against the interests  of Community
industry -  the latter  being an lndustry where some products
are  stlll  eonstralned by  loca1  narket  requlrements and
problems of supply.
These same members belleve  that  in  pursuing the
obJecbive of progresslvely abolishing restrlctlons  on interna-
tlonal  trade, we must not ignore the fact  that  the competitive
condltlons ln  many export markets around the world are often
very dlfferent  from the EEC. It  may, therefore, be danaging
to  EEC export  trade  to  require  free  circulation  of  goods
whllst  these differences persist.
Special att;ention should therefore be paid to  the
texts  of  the free-trade agreements whlch have been concl-uded.
These agreements  include provisions simllar  to Artlcle  85(1)
but  do not  lnclude any power to  grant  temporary  exemptions
even where Justified  ,cn grounds of policy.  Thus, for  example,
whereas ln  relatlon  to lntra-communlty  trade, the Commlsslon --67-
has taken the vlew that  certaln  selective distributlon  agree-
ments are cantrary to ArtlcLe 85(1) but can be permitted under
Article  85(3),  such an exemptlon does not appear possible in
the context of the free trade agreements unless negotiated  and
agreed by  the  Joint  Commlttee set  up  under each of  the
agreements. Thls  could  produce difficuLties  therefore  for
those whose products are most efficiently  dlstributed  through
a  distributlon  netttork.  This  anomaly and  its  potentially
adverse consequences  for  community lndustry should be borne in
mind whenever efforts  are made to  encourage the 'topen market
system", and when the agreements are renegotiated, if  at all'
III.  IMPORTANCE  OF THE ECONOMIC  AND SOCIAL  CONTEXT -  CO-
ORDINATION OF COMMUNITY  POLICIES
With  a  reallstic  approach' economic and  social
aspects (13)  (14)  (15) and the main features of  the present
economlc situatlon  (inflatlon,  unemployment  and energy) (16)
(L7) (1s) (19) are put into  their  proper perspective.
Even the Court of  Justice has shown its  sensltlvity
(zo)  (21)  (22)  (23),  the main consequences being a call  for
more coordination  between Community  policies  (24) (25) and a
greater lnterest  ln  regional  imbalances and structural  prob-
lems (26).
It  should be borne in  mlnd, however, that  the pre-
requlsite  for  a Community competition poli.cy is  that  the baslc
features  of  the  economic and soclal  systems of  the  l{ember
States are the sane, or at any rate, pretty slm11er. Thls-68-
does not mean of  cour'se that  economlc and social systems  have
to  be absolutely ldentlcal  1n al-1 details  but  1t  does mean
that  structural  dlfflerences should not  be  mutually  anta-
gonistlc.  Two examplea lllustrate  this  :
-  A clampdown  on the  right  to  strike  in  on€ of  the  Member
Stal;es cou1d, undeP certaln  clrcumstances,  lead to  serious
dlstortions  of  competition;
-  Simi.Iarly,  if  social  security  systems are  not  baslcally
simllar  in  str.ucture,  distortions  of  competitlon could
ari se .
Theories regardlng the  impact of  free  competitlon
cannot; be divorced f:nom the approach adopted to  competition
policy,  and economic policy  in  general.  Within  the  EEC,
competition policy  j.s  indisputably  a  vital  component of
overafl  economic policy  as  well  as  being interwoven wlth
policies  ln  the social., lndustrial,  regional and other sectors
relate,d to  economlc lpolicy  and with  structural  pollcy  as a
whole.
Generally speaking, a European economic pollcy  must
be founded on the prlnciple  that  competition poIlcy  la  on a
level  with  structural  policy.  fn  each case at  issue we must
theref'ore ask ourselves which of  the two policles  ls  to  take
precedence.  However, competing economic policies,  and struc-
tural  policy  in  partir:ular,  should be so framed as to be com-
patible,  ln  the medluim term, wlth  the aims of  a general com-
petltlon  po1lcy.-69-
Given the existence of  a Regional Fund and a Soclal
Fund, we can but adhere to the vridespread conclusion that  com-
petition  policy  takes  second place  to  regional  structural
policy  and social pol-lcy in  many practical  spheres.  In cases
where social  policy  and regional  structural  pollcy  takes
precedence,  however, competition pol1cy is  not entlrely  sub-
merged. As is  well  known, the Community is  not usually faced
with  alternative,  radical  solutions  but  is  able  to  propose
step-by-step  solutions.  The most intractable problems are the
conflicts  between the goals of  competition  pol1cy on the one
hand and those of  sectoral structural  policies  on the other.
If  an economic sector enters a crisis  then the spectre of  a
structural  crlsis  is  conJured up more often than not.  This 1s
then used to  Justlfy  structural  action.  But 1f the crisis  ie
not structural  but part  of  a long-drawn-out  cycIlcal  problem,
then precipitate  stn:ctural  action would lead in  the medium
term to  misguided  allocatlon  of  resources. Nor should it  be
forgotten that  "normal" structural  changes in  a market economy
must be carried  through with  the help of  competitlon  pollcy.
After  all,  the salient  features of  market economles ls  that
structures  can be  changed and adopted through competition.
NaturalIy there are frequent occurrences of genulne structural
crlses  in  lndlvldual  sectors  when prlorlty  1s  given  to
sectoral  structural  policles.  Even in  such cases, however,
sectoraf structural  policy  should be.applied 1n such a vray as
tiot  to  undermine  the goals of  a general competition policy  1n
the medium tem.-70-
Competition policy  and sLructural  policy  both co-
exist,  and find  themselves in  opposition to  one another, in
the Treaty establishing  the European  Economic Communlty.  Com-
petiti.on  policy  basically  derives from Articles  85 and 86 of
the EIIC Treaty, whilst  structural  policy  is  based principally
on Article  92 et  seq.  However, Article  92(1) clearly  gives
pre-eminence  to competition policy.
Other members are  afraid  thaL the  persistent  and
grave problems  facing the Community in  the economi.c  and social
spheres may result  in  the  Treatyrs  rules  of  competition
remaining a dead letter.  In  their  vj.ew it  would be a serious
error  both in  terrns of  legality  and expediency  to  subordinate
compet;ltion policy  to  other Community policies  such as the
social., regional or  j"ndustrlal policy,  etc.  Rules of  compe-
titiorr  should, on the contrary,  act  as a  frame of  reference
for  al.1 other polici,es.
Other members draw attention  to  the fact  that  the
geogr:phical area  of  the  EEC comprlses disparate markets
with  strong divergencies  i.n consumer pr'eferences;  taxation,
and s()cial security  siystems; political,  economi.c and soc j.al
struct;ures and nation.al price  and other market controls.  As
everyone knows, enerigy policies  differ  considerably but  to
suggesit that competiti.on poLicy can "concern ltself"  with such
differences  is  total.ly  inconsistent  with  the  concept of
compet;itlon and strikes  of  a  dirigiste  or  intervention.ist-7L-
system; on the other hand these disparities  are all  factors
whlch must be taken lnto  account by the Commission ln  applylng
the rules  of  competltlon.  It  ls  clear  that,  as against thts
background, a theoretlcal  approach to integration,  application
of  the  rules  on free  movement and on competition and  the
corollary .that  anything resembling a territorial  restrlction
ls  anathema to the Treaty, could be very damaging to Communlty
industry, and interests  generally.
As regards the
steer surplus labour to
consi.der 1t  essentlal
retralning  measures.
comment in  the Opinion on the need to
growth industries a number of  member:s
that  they  should be  couPled wlth
IV. MIXED  ECONOMY -  FULL INFORMATION  -  AIDS
In  a mixed economy there needs to  be "full  infor-
mationrr about financial  relatlons  between publlc-sector fims
and governments (27)  so that  competition is  not  distorted
(28) (2s).
There is  also a need for  case-by-case monitorlng  of
the  rtaldsil that  oan be granted under the Treaty on specific
condi tions.
?he Commi.ssion has repeatedly taken a stand on state
aid,  the most recent belng its  decislon of  1 February 1980 on
the  introductlon  of  Communlty rules on speclfic  aids for  the
lron  anal steel  inClustry.
Ald policy  should be planned in a more rrtransparent"
hray.
In  most llember States there is  no openly ava11able
lnfotmatlon on state aid.  Ald can be open or hldden and can
be centrallzed or  decentrallzed rlght  dovrn to local authority
1eve1.-72-
Reports should perlodically  be drawn up on aII  these
aids.
In the context of state aids, public enterprises  and
quasi-public  enterprises  have a  special  role  to  play  and
recetve special  mention 1n Article  90 of  the  EEC Treaty.
Historically,  publ1c enterprises, quasi-publ-ic enter?rlses and
public  utilltles  were frequently glven the task of  competing
in certaln markets.  These enterprises then became lnstrunents
of state competition poI1cy.
Irrespective  of  whether public  enterprises,  qua61-
publ1c enterprises arrd public utllities  may stllt  be regarded
as  instruments  of  state  competition today,  the  financlal
relations  between publ1c enterprises and public budgets should
be spelt out cIearly.
The  fact  that  there  can  also  be  com-
petltlon-dlstorting  traidsrr for  private enterprises and private
economlc organlzatlons  ls  also  something that  should not  be
overlooked  when discussing state-aid policy.  Thus, for  exam-
ple,  well-heeled consortla in  a number of sectors are ab]e to
subsidlze  thelr  own  loss-making  branches. Small  and
medlum-sized  enterprlses, however, which do not have the same
opportunities for  crosssubsidization,  are at  a serious dis-
advantage from the  F)olnt of  view of  competition.  Time and
time  again blg  flrms  have penetrated hitherto  medium-slzed
markets by buying upr small and medium-slzed firms,  thereby
permanently affecting  market structures.  Competltion policy
has pald too little  attentlon  to  these phenomena for  a long
tlme nor,{. There can of  course be no question of  preservlng-73-
speclflc  markets for  sma1l and medium-sized enter?r1ses but
state  competition policy  and state  structural  policy  have a
legitlmate  right  to  take  action  when efflcient  small  and
medium-slzed  enterprises  are  forced  out  of  the  market by
newcomers  with greater financial  power.
Other members, however, consider that ful1  knowledge
of  the flnancla]  relations  between prlvate  firms  on the  one
hand and banks or  financlal  consortia  with  predominantly
public capitaf on the other is  not necessary.
Other members by contrast are convinced of the need
for  fu11  inforrnatj.on, for  example ln  cases where 1t  1s
lnportant to know the extent to which aid granted to a firm or
group of  firms  witl  lead  to  the  firm  in  question settlng
abnorrnally  1ow prices,  thus altering  competition  and rendering
it  artificial.
Take for  example the  case of  a steel  group whlch
receives subsidles from the Community to  enable lt  to be pro-
fitable  in  the prevailing climate.  Now if  a shipbuildlng flrm
belonging to  this  group snaps up orders on the  market by
setting  particularly  low  prices  (deliberately  loner  than
Japanese prlces),  full  information is  needed to  gauge the
extent to which ald to  the firm  or group makes for  dlstorted
terms of  competi-tion 1n the shipbuilding industry.-74-
Other members  conslder that  the  present economic
recession, and lnternal  political  pressures in  each Member
State,  lead  governments to  abandon their  ilCommunitativerl
approach and to  assi.st, or  protect,  their  own lndustrles  by
granting aids,  and/on by taklng other protectlonlst  measures.
Such steps are to  an extent understandable, but help in  the
form of a1ds, be they direct  grants or subsidiaries, remlssion
of  taxes or social  securlty payments or other types, may have
the effect  of  simply exportlng the economic problems of  one
area  to  another anrl distorting  the  competitive situation.
Similarly,  protectlonist  measures, such  as  controls  on
advertising, tax discrrimination, imposition of  standards  and
quality  controls,  may hamper effective  competltion within
the EEC, and the Commlssion must be encouraged to continue its
effor.ts  to  elimlnate  those which cannot be justified  on  a
short-term basis or at alL.
V. BUSINESS PRACTICES
The whole of  thls  chapter is  devoted to  the  maln
problems  concerning trusiness practices.
Special att;entlon must clearly  be paid to the small/
medium business sector (32) though there must be no discriml-
natlon against large firms.
Obstacles to  cooperation between flrrns  and  to
research and lnnovat:ion sti1l  rernain, however, and have to be
removed.-75-
The regulation on exenptions for  certain categorles
of patent licence agreements can be improved (32).
Dlstribution  ls  a sector that  has come under more
scrutiny than any other but it  still  calls  for  legal certainty
(32) -  and not onLy ln  respect of selective distributlon.
In  discussing'ragreenent" (gq)  conpetltlon pollcy
must take into  account the international.  context. The lnterna-
tional  context and also  the various national  circurnstances
must also be given their  due weight in  the Draft Regulation on
business mergers (35) (36) (37).
Swifter alignment of  company laws (38) (39) (4O) can
be a f1111p to competltlon pollcy.  Procedures  used ln  applying
competitlon  rules to firms should be speeded up and lnterested
parties  (41) (42) should be given ful1  lnformatlon and better
protectlon.
Advertising  also has an important role  to play (43).
Flna1ly,  the  primacy of  Communi.ty laws over national  laws
shouLd be reflected  in  more and more concrete ways within  the
framework  of  lncreased  cooperation  between  natlonal
admlnistrations  (44).
Some members point  out  that  the Commisslon has ln
certain  cases shown an  unjustlfied  and perhaps dangerous
predilectlon  for  small  firms,  for  example in  the  Draft
Regulatlon on block exemptions  for  patent licences.-76-
The sane members  maintain that  patents are not
anomaly from the  polnt  of  view of  competition but  are
lneentive to lnnovati.on  and competitiveness.
An actlve  llcence market is  a  very posltlve  slgn
provlded technologlcal property rights  are not dlmlnished.
Other members note  the  Commissionrs tendency to
exercise  arbltrary  discrlmination  in  favour  of  the
small./medlum buslness sector and refer  again to  the  Draft
Regu1ation  on block  exemptions for  patent  licences whereby
small. and mediumslzed flrms  can have excluslve control  over
lnlti.al  sales.
There is  similar  and  Ilkewise  unJustified  dis-
crlmi.nation against bigger fllrns  in  respect of  distribution
agreements.
The implioation  that  mere size  1s  automatlcally
lndicative  of  antl-crcmpetltive  behaviour or  is  otherwlse bad,
without any analysls of  the structure of  the relevant market,
cannot be accepted.
Deallng with  the notion of  "dominant pobitlon'r,  the
Comml.sslon  makes it  clear  that  it  is  not lmportant whether a
flrm ls  big or not.
What 1s  more important than slze,  is  whether a
medlum-slzed  or  big  firm  has  a  dominant positlon,  i.e.
lnfluences the market by lts  posltlon ln  that market.
an
an-77-
Other nembers stress the role of  smal-1 flrms.
The large  number of  small and medlum firms,  their
geographical dispersion and the  indivldualistic  and enter-
prislng  spirit  of  their  managers, stimuLates competition  and
gives consumers possibilttles  of  choice and easy supplies.
If  their  size  makes it  easier  for  SMEs to  adapt
rapidly  and relatively  cheaply to  changlng market needs, 1t
also makes then more vulnerable to  competition  from flrms  1n
dominant positlons  lnsofar  as the  latter  make use of  thelr
economlc por{er in  the market, or  thelr  wide range of products
on offer,  to wlpe out SMES by abnorrnal means. It  is  therefore
necessary, ln  the  interests  of  maintaining a  healthy  and
workable competition system, to  protect  SMES agalnst unfair
practices  through adequate  legislative  and  admlnlstrative
measures as well  as through legal  means; at  the same time the
notion of  rrrelevant  marketrr should be made to work more to  the
advantage of  SMES when evaluating the competitlve position of
bigger  fitms,  especially  those operating in  the  field  of
dl st ributl on.-78-
Many members stress  the  importance  of
"preventlveI  nature  of  merger control  and hope that
Council w111 approve the Regulation heavily supported  by
Committee  in  an oplnlon in  1974.
The Corunission realizes that  the need for  Community
merger control is  generally recognized by all  Member States.
There is  broad agreement that  :
the
the
the
-  the  scope of  the  Regulation
basls  of  both market share
elther  of  these criterla  not
would not be applicable;
should be determlned on the
and overall  turnover.  Should
be fulfilled,  the Regulatlon
state  undertakings should be covered, along with banks and
insurance companies,  unless these sectors are  deatt  with
separately in  speci,al regulations;
exemption might be granted for  a  merger precluded by the
competition rules  :if  so warranted on grounds of  economic,
social,  regional  or  other  policies  acknowledged to  have
Fri,3111y. Whether or  not account should be taken solely  of
Community policles  llas not yet been settled;
-  the emphasls should be on prevention.-79-
The main outstanding  issue is  how the Member States
are  to  be  lnvolved  in  the  decision-making  process'  viz'
whether the commission alone should take decislons  and whether
consultation of  the Member States is  to be compulsory.
As far  as the harmonization of  company law is  con-
cerned, a  large  number of  members underline  the  need to
concentrate efforts  on a specific  number of  urgent questions
rather  than to  speed up the  "mass" adoption of  dlrectlves'
some of  which  are  of  marginal importance  and others  so
controversial that consensus appears impossible.
Efforts  should be concentrated  on V (structure  of
company bodies) and VII  (consolidated  accounts). some menbers
feel  that  efforts  should  also  be  concentrated  on  the
"VREDELING Dlrective"
On the  question of  procedural rules  for  applying
rules of  competition to  firms'  some members point out .that it
is  lmportant -  as with  any systern of  law -  that  both parties
to  a  case do not  feel  that  declsions are  being made on
arbltrary  or subjecti.ve grounds.
fn  some circles  such confidence is  waning rapidly'
It  is  even felt  that the Commission has on occaslons based its
decisions on inaccurate facts,  and its  arguments have been
weak or  lnsufficientty  thought through, while  an effectlve
control over the Commlssion has been absent.
This  is  because, ln  the  view  of  some members,
appeals to  the Court of  Justice can be a waste of  time and
energy and have the  added disadvantage that  the  Court has
shown reluctance to  examlne and anafyse in  detall  the often
frequently  complex facts  of  a  case and to  exercise ful1
control  over the  Commissionrs  procedure.  Accordlng to  these
same members, such problems could be overcome 1f  flrms  felt-80-
they had adequate opportunltles to  respond to  evidence cited
by  the  Commlssion and  therefore  had  the  opportunity  of
agreelng the facts  of  a case. fn  their  vien,  the procedures
adopted by the Comm:ission have also cast doubts on the care
and fairness lnvolved in  the conduct of  the comnission's orar.
hearing, and on the ethics of usJ.ng the confidentlal  advlce of
a company's iegal advlsers in  examinlng a company,s  conduct -
something which  invades  the  whole  concept  of  "1ega1
professional privilege".
As  regards  the  supremacy
general, the Commisston encourages the
legls;lation on competition  as this  is
an active Community competltion policy.
of  Communlty law  tn
development of natlonal
an essentlal adJunct of
It  w111 al.so make it  possible in  some measure ro
dece'tralize  imprementation  of  community  raw. Repeatedly, in
lts  rulings,  the court has dwelt on the direct  lmpact of  the
bans provided for  1n Articl.es g5 and g6 of the EEC Treaty.
A  distlnction  must be  drawn between contractual
sltuatlons'  whlch are governed by Artlcle  gs, and structural
situatlons,  possibly falllng  within  the scope of Article  86 or
the future merger control regulation.
By common agreement, natlonal- authorization cannot
overrule a communlty ban under Artlcr.e g5. The natter  ls  less
clearcut  in  cases involving  Artlcle  g5(3) (authorlzatlon of
exemptlona),  where natlonal law may be more restrlctlve.-81  -
Uhere potentlal  conflicts  between Community and
national law are dealt with,  notably by regulation but aLso by
individual  decision,  it  would seem to  be accepted in  theory
that national law could to  some extent act as a corrective.
The  fundamental consideration  must  be  that  a
decision by  the Commission under Article  85(3) to  recognize
that  an agreement complles with a vital  priority  economic aim
cannot be set aside by a decision  based on national law.
Caution is  even more necessary in  the complex matter
of  mergers (structural  operations).  The co-exi.stence of  a
future rnerger control regulation, under which exemptions  could
be granted on politica)-,  industri-aI  or  social  grounds for
mergers, j.n for  instance the chemicals industry of  a Member
State,  wi"th a  Government ban on mergers in  that  industry,
cannot automatically be ruled out.
On the other hand, where a Community decision to ban
a merger is  based on the regulations, authorization  should not
be possible under national Law.
Some members, however, point  out  that  where a
decision under Articte  85(3) has not been taken, the national
authorities  have the  power and indeed the  duty  to  apply
lrtjcle  85(1)  and 86 where appropriate, and also  to  apply
their  own national  laws except to  the  extent  that  these
preJudlce the  applicatlon  of  Community law.  National  laws-82-
co-exlst  rrylth the  tJommunlty rules  because they  take  lnto
account different  consideratlons. The co-existence of national
and EEC lal|, was recently explalned by the Court.
VI.  CONSUMER  PROTECTION
ft  1s wldely recogni.zed that consumer protectlon has
an important role to play in competition policy  (45) (46) (42)
(48).
The concept of  consumer protection  i.s  somewhat
amblvalent as lnterpretations  and the arguments invokeo vary
widely.
For lnstance, one approach is  that  consumers must
recelve extensive protectlon  lf  they are to  play  thei.r part
properly ln  a market economy governed by the rules of  competl_
t ion.
In ahort, consumer protectlon ls  seen as a prerequi_
site  for  effective  competition.
However, consumer protection  policy  is  not  in
general- founded on  thls  lnterpretatlon.  The  uhderlyi.ng
prlnclple  is  far  more that  the cornpetlng forces of  supply and
demand leave  the  consumer lnadequately protected and that
special safeguarrls are therefore requlred.-E3-
Governments unable to conduct effectlve  economic and
competition policies  find  consumer protection  a  convenient
stop-gap solutlon.
Consumer protection  can be broken down into  the
following sub-dlvislons :
-  lega] protection and protection of property;
-  protection of  information;
-  protection of public health;
-  environment conservation.
Seen in  this  perspective, protection of  infomatlon
basically .operates on tvro leve1s :
-  firstly,  setting  limits  for  advertising  and other  sales
drives;
-  secondly,  determining what  minimum details  are  to  be
provided to the consuner.
Suppliers are prone to  critj.cize  any lmprovenent ln
consuner protection  as an intolerable  financlal- or  adminis-
trative  constralnt.
The matter, however, can also be approached from the
consumerts angle.
In  any event, one consideration  must be borne in
mind: most lmprovements to consumer protection are expensive.-84-
Though the suppller ls  admlttedly uEually the one to
pay,  the  hlgher co$ts lnvolved are incorporated lnto  retall
prices,  at  any rate  1n the medlum term, with  the result  that
when all  is  said an.d done, consumers land up financing their
ovrn protection.
The vast  majority  of  members have no particular
objections to.thls  or to the Opi-nionts conclusions.
vII.  CONPITIoNS  FOR THE DEVELOPMENT  OF A COMPETITION  pOLICy
fn  the light  of  what has already been sald,  there
are  a  number of  conditlons for  the  development of  a  com-
petitlon  policy.  These are as follows  :
-  need for  an  t,open,t
account (a)  changing
the Community and (b)
the world;
competiti.on policy  that  takes  into
social  and economic circumstances in
trade developments with  the rest  of
monitorlng of  dumping and all  abnomal forms  of  competl_
tlon  (49);
cooperatlon  between  Member States (SO1 152y.
coordlnatlon of  Community pblictes  (SZ) by,  anong other
means, the improved efflclency  of the  Commisslonrs  depart_
ments working together ln closer harmony (51) (59).-85-
Some members suggest that  in  order to  further  the
I'po1itica1" interpretation  of rules of  competltion  (a tendency
already underway with  the commiEsion  and court of.Justlce)  lt
would help  "de  Jure  condendo" if  competition  policy  r"ere
vigorously adnlnistered  by a  body with  active  discretionary
powers (incentives)  and not  by  a  Jurisdlctlonal  body whose
sole authority was to lnpose fines.
Other members stress the  importance they attach to
the t'harmonized"  co-existence of Community policy  and natlonal
competltion policles.
Other members conslder that  since the Community is
based on free trade and a mixed economy, vigorous  competition
is  seen as  the  best  way of  encouraging  efficiency  in
production and distribution  at  an optimum price;  encouraging
newtechnologies;investment;encouragingnewentrarltsto
the market; containing prlces;  flghtlng  lnflation;  indeed'
consumers regard competition  as their  best friend.
Competltion policy  and Laws are intended to  ensure
the free pl.ay of  market forces and to ensure that conpetition
is  fair  by prohlbiting  abuses of  dominant positions.  But j'n
the  EEC, competitlon polioy  has an additlonal  and  speclal
aspect :  that  is,  it  has an important role  to  play  in  the
development of  a  common market from among its  constltuent
rnembers.-8,6-
With regard to  the  aims of  a  general competition
policy,  the sane members point out that over many years therb
have been attempts to  reach agreement on an international
basis on restrictive  business practices but these have always
failed;  the main reason for  failure  is  that  competition laws
reflect  the po11tical,  economic and social  policies  of  each
country and it  follows  that  what might be acceptable in  the
interests of  one country may not be acceptable to another  and
in practlce lt  has pl:oved very difficult  to settle  disputes of
this  klnd,  and  thus  it  is  irnperative that  each country
respects the sovereignty of  another.
Lastly,  some members reiterate  the principles  they
propounded earlier,  namely that  it  is  absolutely essential to
consj.der the rules oll competition laid  down in  the Treaty as a
frame of reference for  other Community  policies.  Only by doing
so can soltd  foundatlons be laid  for  the economic and social
devel.opment of the Community.European  Communities -  Economic  and Socj-aI Conmittee
"Community  Competi.tlon  Policy  in  the  Li'ght of  the  Current
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This Opinion was prornpLed  by the profound. convic-
tidn  that  in  a  neriod  of  -such serlous,  persistent  social
anci economic diiflculties,  a1I  Community policies  ought
to  be implemented  as effectiveJ.y as possible' -with the maxi-
mum possible coordinatj-on and with all  reasonable speed'
The current economic and social  situation  warrants
special  attention  for  the  implementation of  the  rules  on
^^mhatiti6n-  The latter  are,  after  all,  an  'instrumentt vv,,,vv  vr  wrv...
for  achleving the  obiectives  of  the  Treaty of  Rome '  The
Commlttee feels  that  any dogmatic or  theoretical  approach
should be avoided from now on and that  competition policy
shouLd be viewed in  conJunction wi-th the Community's  overall
actj.vities  which, in  tur-n, must be seen in  the broader world
context.Rue Ravenstein  2
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